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1.1 Formal Semantics vs the Representational Theory
of Mind
Formal, or model-theoretic, semantics is arguably the most successful
theory of meaning for natural language. Sentence meanings are identified with
their truth conditions. In order to derive compositionally the infinite set of
sentence truth conditions from a finite set of primitive expressions, the primi-
tive expressions get assigned as meanings set-theoretic constructions built on
top of truth-values (type t), real-world objects (type e) and possible worlds
(type s). Formal semantics as such makes no claims concerning the mecha-
nisms that allow us humans to grasp these kinds of meanings.1 Clearly, sets of
possible worlds cannot be directly stored in the brain (unless we are speaking
of some very restricted finite sets).
On the other hand, at least a seriously taken viewpoint in the philos-
ophy of mind is the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) (Fodor, 1975).
1The characterization of formal semantics given here does not take into account the Dis-
course Representation Theory (DRT) group of views, where, at a minimum, the notion of
a sentence meaning is changed (to a so-called context change potential) and a new basic
type is added (discourse referents or “pegs”). More significantly for the purposes of this
investigation, some proponents of DRT (Asher, 1986; Kamp, 1990; Kamp et al., 2005) argue
for a representational account of belief, and certain theories (such as the account of pre-
supposition of van der Sandt (1992)) crucially rely on using representations in computing
meanings.
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This theory maintains that (at least part of) our cognitive activity consists
in manipulating sentence-like representations in our brains. Believing a sen-
tence to be true, to a first approximation, amounts to having a token of this
sentence, translated into some internal language, in the appropriate region of
our minds (often called “belief box”). Sentences in this language are somehow
semantically interpreted, so that we can determine their truth conditions.
A natural component of the Representational Theory of Mind is the
Representational Theory of Thinking, stating that our logical abilities consist
(at least in part) in building new internal-language representations on the basis
of old ones, in a manner similar to inference in logics.
The viewpoint of RTM is in principle compatible with the viewpoint of
model-theoretic semantics. It is conceivable that the proper semantics of the
natural language is provided by set-theoretic structures, even though thoughts
are stored in the mind in sentence-like form. After all, this is how most kinds
of logics work: their semantics is based on set-theoretic models while mathe-
maticians build proofs using formulas and inference rules.
The meaning of our language’s sentences could be adequately charac-
terizable by their truth conditions, and sentence-like representations in our
minds could be a way of getting at those truth conditions.
The goal of this thesis is to show that such a picture is insufficient; that
there exist constructions in natural language whose proper analysis crucially
involves the Representational Theory of Mind and sentential representations
in the minds of the speakers. Such constructions present language users as rea-
soners who perform inferences on their internal representations; which classes
of inferences are taken into account depends on the particular construction.
2
1.2 Plan of the thesis
In order to make my viewpoint detailed enough for it to have any pre-
dictive power, I start off in Chapter 2 by developing a formal logical system
that I use in later chapters to couch my analyses in. The logic developed in
this chapter is actually too restricted to capture any of the natural language
constructions I am going to talk about (in particular, the only variety of the
agent’s internal language mentioned there is propositional logic; the rules em-
ployed have a very simple structure and are non-defeasible), but on one hand,
it is simple enough to be rigorously analyzed, and on the other hand, rich
enough to serve as a base for extensions that are used for natural language
phenomena (different extensions are used for different constructions).
After laying the foundation in Chapter 2, I turn to individual language
constructions that show dependence on human inferential capabilities. First,
Chapter 3 takes on indirect speech reports. The range of inferential transfor-
mations allowed in these reports is narrower than in other constructions I talk
about, and this is the shortest of the linguistic chapters. At the same time
it serves to demonstrate the overall schema that I use in investigating each
group of phenomena.
Chapter 4 talks about belief ascriptions. Of all the constructions stud-
ied in this work, belief and belief reports have received the most attention from
philosophers. So, unsurprisingly, a large part of that chapter is devoted to the
discussion of various points of view, a number of which are very close to my
own.
Chapter 5 is concerned with a more exotic topic, morphologically ex-
pressed evidentiality. Bulgarian serves here as a case study. Again, in order
to even start discussing the issues that worry me, I have to first introduce the
3
Bulgarian verbal categories in question and the existing research. The prob-
lem I am most concerned with are the limits of applicability for the hearsay
marker (Renarrated) and the inference marker (Conclusive).
Finally, Chapter 6 deals with clarity assertions. The so called “paradox
of clarity” was introduced by Barker and Taranto (2003). I argue against their
solution of the paradox and embrace a theory they explicitly reject, the missing
inference theory. This work can also be compared to von Fintel and Gillies
(2009a), dealing with epistemic must in English.
A bit of terminology is in order here. Several constructions under con-
sideration — indirect speech, hearsay evidentials and belief reports when based
on believer’s own assertions, — involve a primary utterance p by a primary
speaker A and a secondary utterance q made by a secondary speaker B whose
truth conditions depend on the contents of the primary one. For example,
when A says:
(1) A: Horses eat oats and hay.
then B later, on the basis of this, can make a secondary utterance:
(2) B: A said that horses eat oats and hay.
For each particular construction, the focus of my investigation will be the
relation between the primary and the secondary utterances; namely, what is
the range of primary utterances p that can justify a given secondary utter-
ance q? And conversely, given a primary utterance p, which (true) secondary
utterances q can it give rise to?
In each of the linguistic chapters, there is a section towards the end
where I try to build an analysis using the formal apparatus of the logic chap-
4
ter. The formal language of Chapter 2 usually proves insufficient to capture
the intricacies of the natural language constructions. In each case, I propose
extensions to the formalism. The properties of such extended systems are not
studied as rigorously as those of the basic system.
Readers whose main interests lie on the linguistic side of my endeavour
can safely ignore both Chapter 2 and the formal sections of the later chapters.
My linguistic conclusions are largely independent from the logical language I
use to make them precise.
1.3 Human inference systems
It should be noted that even though in Chapter 2 I concentrate on the
case of an agent who uses Natural Deduction as his inference system, I don’t
expect that the system employed by actual human agents is very similar. In
particular, there is no reason to expect that this system will be
• minimal, containing no redundant rules;
• monotonic.
Even when a certain general rule is available to an agent, this may not prevent
the same agent from having a number of its more particular instances written
into the inference system as separate rules. These particular rules may happen
to be more easily accessible than the general one, and a natural language
construction may allow use of such rules while prohibiting the general one.
An example can be seen on p. 80, in the discussion of the subtyping rule.
Furthermore, many rules employed by human reasoners are heuristic,
they don’t guarantee the truth of their conclusion with absolute certainty.
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This leads to effects like the Paradox of Clarity (Chapter 6).
1.4 Limitations of my work
The task I set out to handle — proving that inferential processes deserve
a place in proper semantic theory, — occupies nearly all of my attention. This
is why I deliberately refrain from handling some of the related questions.
First of all, I never justify my use of RTM; I just take it for granted.
The only place where I mention any alternative theories is in §4.1, and the
discussion there is limited to the topic at hand, i. e. belief and belief reports.
Second, some of the constructions I work with (especially indirect speech
and belief reports) are among the most familiar material in the philosophy of
language. However my purposes are different from those of most authors writ-
ing about those topics, so I make the following assumptions about my agents:
• they are not confused about identities and they correctly use their general
terms, including natural kind terms;
• their language is free of indexicals.
This makes the material I study uninteresting for many philosophers of lan-
guage; my agents are not confused in ways that help them in their studies.
My agents are, however, imperfect in a different way: they have limited logical
abilities.
Third, truth conditions for every construction I discuss are vague. Cer-
tain uses of the construction are definitely true, certain uses are definitely
false, but some just feel uneasy. The only way I can see of dealing with this
6
vagueness is to pretend it does not exist; therefore I present language as be-
ing more systematic than it really is. My general strategy in each case is
to take the narrowest possible stance: everything suspicious is declared false.
This causes my rules to undergenerate; lots of existing usage will be called
erroneous, sloppy application of rules. One case where this strategy fails is
the Bulgarian data; not being a speaker of the language, I have to take the
judgments of my consultants at face value.
1.5 Neutrality
Even though I rely heavily on RTM in my work, I wish to remain
neutral with respect to many of important statements defended by some of its
proponents. In particular:
• I don’t claim that RTM is even true. All I care about is that some form
of RTM is built into the linguistic picture of the world, the “natural
language metaphysics”. Pieces of information about the world built into
the language itself are known to be sometimes wrong — we talk about
the rising of the sun, but it is very hard, if possible at all, to give an
analysis of the predicate rise that would make this statement literally
true. In a similar way, the best description of our cognitive life may in-
volve neural nets with no recognizable syntactic structure, or something
else entirely; our common-sense psychology presented by the language
may be so wrong that there is no way to make sense of it. What I set out
to demonstrate is that the proper presentation of the linguistic picture
unavoidably includes RTM.2
2The possibility discussed here is close to the position advocated in (Stich, 1983).
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• It does not matter to me whether the internal language, so called Men-
talese, is universal; whether it is the same across all of our species or
even among speakers of the same natural language. If it is not, I only
need personal varieties of Mentalese to be broadly translatable into each
other; I will also claim that our linguistic picture includes a scale, a
measure of difficulty among various inferences agents can perform.
• It is beyond my sphere of interest how the primitive symbols of Mentalese
acquire their meanings and what those meanings consist in (they should
at least be sufficient to determine truth conditions of complete formulas
in the belief box). I expect that some causal story should eventually be
told about acquisition of these meanings; possibly some of the causes in
the story operate over the lifetime of our species rather than an individual
speaker; the meanings dependent on those will be innate. In any case,
nothing in this work depends on any of that.
• In my representations of Mentalese sentences I try to be as close as pos-
sible to first-order logic, but this is just for the purposes of presentation.
I don’t know what the actual syntax of Mentalese looks like; all I hope
is that both the formulas I use and the inference rules I ascribe to my
agents are translatable into the actual mental code.
Another simplification I make is that I assume tokens of internal lan-
guage to form separate linearizable sentences. I don’t see any reason for the
mental code to consist of linear (or even tree-like) pieces. I expect chunks of
this code to be more like data in computer memory, with lots of pointers and
massive structure sharing. But sentences and formulas are much easier to talk
about in linear text, so this is what I use.
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Chapter 2
Syntactic dynamic doxastic logic
Consider an agent whose state contains a set of formulas in some inter-
nal language —his beliefs1, and who possesses a rule-based inference system
(such as natural deduction). By applying rules, the agent is able to add their
conclusions to his own state and thus transition into new states. The basic
idea is to use the apparatus of dynamic logic to describe these transitions.
In this chapter, I consider two related formal implementations of this
basic idea. In Section 2.1, an approach with an agent using a Fitch-style de-
duction system is given. In Section 2.2 the agent is taken to be using Gentzen-
style proofs. The resulting logic is strictly more expressive, but, in the general
case, undecidable. Section 2.3 compares my logics to other related systems.
Section 2.4 discusses some possible extensions2.
1Here I am using the word ‘belief’ in a technical sense; no claim is made that this sense
corresponds to the meaning of the natural-language verb ‘to believe’. Belief ascriptions in
natural language are studied in Chapter 4.
2In the course of this chapter, I use the letters p, q for sentential variables of the agent’s
internal language; a, b for metavariables, ζ, η, θ, ξ for arbitrary formulas of the internal lan-
guage, as well as for formula patterns, α, β for arbitrary actions, R,Q for rules of the agent’s
logic/elementary actions in the external language, x, y for CFDL action variables, φ, χ, ψ
for formulas of the external language, s, t for states in the model.
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2.1 Logic for a Fitch-style reasoning agent
Let us start to make the idea more specific. The first step is to assume
that the agent’s internal language L is context-free with no ambiguities (or,
equivalently, that its formulas are stored in the agent’s memory as syntactic
trees), and that formulas can have other formulas as constituents.
I am also going to use formula patterns. Let us have a countable set of
metavariables a, b, . . . , a1 , a2 , . . .. A formula pattern is a formula where zero
or more subformulas are replaced by metavariables. Given a formula pattern
η and a substitution σ that takes metavariables to formulas, with dom(σ)
including all the metavariables in η, ση is called an instance of the pattern.
We shall also, for now, assume that the agent uses a Fitch-style calculus
for his proof system, and so the rules he employs are of two types: simple rules
and subproof rules. Simple rules have the form
ζ1 ζ2 . . . ζn
η
R
where R is the name of the rule, and ζ i and η are formula patterns. Subproof






where Q is the name of the rule, and ζ, η and θ are formula patterns.
Having thus established what the agent’s internal language and proof
system are, we turn to the task of specifying the external language FL we will
use to describe the agent’s states.
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For an internal-language formula η, we shall use the external-language
formula Bη to denote that the agent has η in his belief state.
We will use rule names as elementary actions in dynamic logic. Here the
question of granularity becomes evident: how finely do we distinguish between
rules? One solution is to treat every instance of a rule as a separate action. In
that case, however, the agent can only use this action at most once to change
his state: after that, the rule’s conclusion will already be a part of his beliefs.
The resulting system will be simpler to analyze, but it won’t be possible to
indicate that a certain general rule, or a certain combination of such rules, is
sufficient to derive a certain conclusion when applied repeatedly. Also, from
the formal point of view, the system I propose has a finite set of elementary
actions, while if we consider each instance of a rule a separate action, this
number will be infinite.
We are ready now to define the syntax and semantics of our external
language. First, the syntax.
Definition 2.1.1 The set of actions is the smallest set produced by the fol-
lowing rules:
1. Each rule R is an action;
2. If α and β are actions, then α ∪ β (non-deterministic choice) and α; β
(sequential combination) are actions;
3. If α is an action, then α∗ (iterate α zero or more times) is an action as
well.
Definition 2.1.2 The set of formulas is the smallest set produced by the
following rules:
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1. For a formula η of the agent’s internal language, Bη is a formula of the
external language;
2. If φ and ψ are formulas, then ¬φ and φ ∨ ψ are formulas;
3. If φ is a formula and α is an action, then 〈α〉φ is a formula.
The connectives ∧, →, ↔ and the modality symbol [α] are defined in
the usual way.
Now the semantics.
Definition 2.1.3 A state is a finite set of formulas in the agent’s internal
language.
Definition 2.1.4 Accessibility relations between states induced by the ac-
tions, JαK, are built recursively:
1. For an elementary action (that is, a rule) R, states s and t stand in the
relation JRK iff either
(a) t = s,3 or
(b) t = s ∪ {η}, and either
i. R is a simple rule, and there exists an instance of R such that
its conclusion is η and all the premises belong to s, or
3The reason I include the first alternative (which makes every accessibility relation in
the system reflexive) is that my system is meant to model agents such as humans. It is safe
to assume that beyond a certain class of beliefs that we are interested in, the agent also
possesses some unrelated beliefs which he can also reason about. Such unrelated inferences
will not change the parts of his state that we are set to describe. In addition, the agent is
free to perform inferences whose conclusions are already in his belief state.
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ii. R is a subproof rule, and there exists an instance of R such that
its conclusion is η, and all the formulas used in the subproof as
premises, except for the opening one, belong to s.
2. Accessibility relation induced by a non-deterministic choice action is the
union of relations induced by its components:
Jα ∪ βK = JαK ∪ JβK
3. Relation induced by a sequential action is the composition of relations
induced by its components:
Jα; βK = JαK ◦ JβK
4. Accessibility relation induced by an iterated action is the reflexive tran-
sitive closure of that action’s relation:
Jα∗K = JαK∗ =
⋃
i∈0 ..ωJαKi
Definition 2.1.5 Interpretation function for formulas relative to a state,
JφKs , is defined by the rules:
1. An elementary formula Bη is true at s iff η belongs to s:
JBηKs =
{
true if η ∈ s
false otherwise
2. Truth functional connectives are defined as usual:
J¬φKs = ¬JφKs
Jφ ∨ ψKs = JφKs ∨ JψKs
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3. Diamonds are also defined as usual, with accessibility relations corre-
sponding to the actions:
J〈α〉φKs =

true if there exists a state t such that
sJαKt and JφKt = true
false otherwise
Essentially, my logic has a single Kripke-style model for dynamic logic
M = 〈S,R0 , . . . , Rn , V 〉 where S is a (countably infinite) set of states, R0
to Rn are accessibility relations for elementary actions, and V is a labeling
function assigning sets of elementary formulas to states. I could have stated
explicitly that a model is such a structure and impose restrictions on models
that guarantee, for each state s and each rule instance η1 , . . . ηn ⇒ Riζ appli-
cable at that state, that there is a state t accessible from s through Ri such
that V (t) = V (s)∪{ζ}. Furthermore, for each arc in the accessibility relation
sRit there should be a corresponding rule instance. Similar restrictions should
be given for subproof rules. This is the approach taken in (Jago, 2006).
But for such a setup, it is easy to show that states with identical la-
belings are bisimilar, and thus modally equivalent, so essentially all the infor-
mation you need in a state is the set of formulas believed there. I chose to
identify a state with that set of formulas.
2.1.0.1 Examples
To provide a specific example, let us assume that the agent’s internal
language S is the standard language of sentential logic (with ¬, ∧, ∨ and
→ as connectives), and that the agent uses the following variant of natural
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(The O is for “observation”.)
Let us also introduce the following abbreviation:
Infer ≡ (¬I ∪ ¬E ∪ ∧I ∪ ∧E ∪ ∨I ∪ ∨E ∪→I ∪→E)∗
(This is the transitive closure of all the usual rules, not including O.)
We also introduce a new symbol. Let !φ mean “φ has become true at
the last state change”. It is not quite an abbreviation — capturing this idea
would require extending our current semantics to keep track of the formula
that has just been introduced, — but we can always recursively translate a
15
formula of the form 〈R〉φ containing the ! symbol into one that does not:
〈R〉!φ ≡ ¬φ ∧ 〈R〉φ
〈R〉(!φ ∨ ψ) ≡ 〈R〉!φ ∨ 〈R〉ψ
〈R〉(φ∨!ψ) ≡ 〈R〉φ ∨ 〈R〉!ψ
〈R〉¬!φ ≡ φ ∨ 〈R〉¬φ
〈R〉〈Q〉!φ ≡ 〈R〉(〈Q〉!φ)
〈R〉〈α ∪ β〉!φ ≡ 〈R〉〈α〉!φ ∨ 〈R〉〈β〉!φ
〈R〉〈α; β〉!φ ≡ 〈R〉〈α〉〈β〉!φ
〈R〉〈α∗〉!φ ≡ 〈R〉!φ ∨ 〈R〉〈α∗〉〈α〉!φ
〈R〉!!φ ≡ 〈R〉!φ
〈R〉¬!!φ ≡ 〈R〉¬!φ
Here are some formulas in our language, with their intended meaning:
〈→E〉!Bp p is derivable by a single application of →E
〈Infer〉Bp p is derivable (it is not specified what the deriva-
tion looks like).
〈∧E;∨E;→E〉!Bp There is a derivation with a specific shape that
leads to p.
[Infer](Bp→ Bq) The only way the agent can reach p is via q.
[O](Bq →!〈Infer〉Bp) If the agent acquires the belief q, he will gain the
ability to derive p.
Here are some valid formula schemas:4
[α](φ→ ψ)→ ([α]φ→ [α]ψ) (2.1)
〈α〉(φ ∨ ψ)↔ 〈α〉φ ∨ 〈α〉ψ (2.2)
〈α∗〉φ↔ φ ∨ 〈α〉〈α∗〉φ (2.3)
Bη → [Infer]Bη (2.4)
〈R〉(!Bη → ¬!Bζ), for η 6≡ ζ (2.5)
B¬¬η → 〈¬E〉Bη (2.6)
4⊥ is a shortcut for an arbitrary contradiction.
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〈¬E〉!Bη → B¬¬η (2.7)
[O](Bη → 〈Infer〉B⊥)→ 〈¬I〉B¬η (2.8)
〈¬I〉!B¬η → [O](Bη → 〈Infer〉B⊥) (2.9)
Bη ∧Bζ → 〈∧I〉B(η ∧ ζ) (2.10)
〈∧I〉!B(η ∧ ζ)→ Bη ∧Bζ (2.11)
B(η ∧ ζ)→ 〈∧E〉Bη ∧ 〈∧E〉Bζ (2.12)
!〈∧E〉Bη∧!〈∧E〉Bζ →!B(η ∧ ζ)∨!B(ζ ∧ η) (2.13)
Bη → 〈∨I〉B(η ∨ ζ) ∧ 〈∨I〉B(ζ ∨ η) (2.14)
〈∨I〉!B(η ∨ ζ)→ Bη ∨Bζ (2.15)
B(η ∨ ζ) ∧B(η → θ) ∧B(ζ → θ)→ 〈∨E〉Bθ (2.16)
[O](Bη → 〈Infer〉Bζ)→ 〈→I〉B(η → ζ) (2.17)
〈tI〉!B(η → ζ)→ [O](Bη → 〈Infer〉Bζ) (2.18)
B(η → ζ) ∧Bη → 〈→E〉Bζ (2.19)
〈O〉Bη (2.20)
(2.1) is the familiar axiom K; putting it here reminds that our logic is a
normal modal logic; (2.2) and (2.3) are examples of propositional dynamic logic
axioms; all other PDL axioms, of course, are valid as well. (2.4) states that
the agent’s reasoning is monotonic; beliefs are never lost. (2.5) declares that
the agent acquires at most one belief at each inferential step. The rest of the
formula schemas reflect the behaviour of natural deduction rules. (2.6), (2.8),
(2.10), (2.12), (2.14), (2.16), (2.17), (2.19) and (2.20) demonstrate “forward
reasoning”: given that the agent knows the premises of a rule instance, we
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conclude that he is able to deduce the conclusion. We can state such axioms
for every rule. On the other hand, (2.7), (2.9), (2.11), (2.13), (2.15) and (2.18)
show “backward reasoning”: knowing that by application of a given rule the
agent can deduce a certain new formula (hence the !s in all of these rules),
we conclude that the agent already possesses the premises.5 For certain rules
there is no way to recover the premises from the conclusion (∨E, →I, O). For
example, given that η is derivable by an application of modus ponens, we can
conclude that for some ζ, the agent has both ζ and ζ → η in his belief box,
but we don’t know what ζ is. Since we don’t have quantification over formulas
in our language, we cannot even express that knowledge. This consideration
makes it unlikely for F s to turn out axiomatizable.
Monotonicity of the agent’s inference system ensures that certain for-
mulas, such as those of the form 〈α〉Bη, once true stay true. That is, on any
chain of states linked by transitions, these formulas can change their value at
most once — from false to true. Of course, there is a dual class, formulas of
the form [α]¬Bη, that only change their value from true to false.
A question emerges: is it possible for a formula to change its truth value
an infinite number of times as the agent’s inference progresses? The answer is
yes. For example, the formula F = 〈→E〉(〈→E〉Bp∧¬〈→E〉Bq) does that in
the following chain of inference, starting from the state s0 = {s, s → r, r →
5In (Konolige, 1990) this mode of reasoning is called explanatory belief ascription.
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p, r → q}:
Rule used Result Value of F
At s0 false
→I (r ∧ r)→ p false
→I s→ (r ∧ r) true
→I (r ∧ r)→ q false
→I (r ∧ (r ∧ r))→ p false
→I s→ (r ∧ (r ∧ r)) true
→I (r ∧ (r ∧ r))→ q false
. . .
Existence of such formulas makes it impossible to attack the problem of de-
cidability for F S in the following way: create a finite submodel by filtering
the whole model through some set of sentences, then enrich it so that every
nontrivial transition is justified by some instance of the corresponding rule,
then add other nodes so that the submodel becomes part of the whole model
M . When the set of sentences we filter through includes formulas such as
F , the filtered structure is going to contain nontrivial cycles. Therefore, no
‘enrichment’ will ever convert it into a part of a proper model.
For certain applications, we might want to ascribe our agents ability to
perform certain simple inferences “effortlessly”, so that an agent who possesses
the premises of such an inference automatically acquires the conclusion. (For
example, our agent may perform conjunction simplifications in such a way.)
To capture such “free” inferences, we might redefine the notion of a state: a
state is a set of sentences closed under certain operations. This, in turn, leads
to a modified definition of the accessibility relation for elementary actions:
For a rule R, states s and t stand in the relation JRK iff either
1. t = s, or
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2. R is a simple rule, there exists an instance of R where all the
premises belong to s, and t is the smallest state extending s
and containing the conclusion η of that instance.
3. R is a subproof rule, there exists an instance of R such that all
the premises mentioned in the subproof belong to s, and t is
the smallest state extending s and containing the conclusion
η of that instance.
This move is proposed by (Ågotnes, 2004). I will not use it in the remainder
of this text.
The logic as described here lacks compactness for two separate reasons.
On the one hand, it is a species of dynamic logic, and so the following kind of
finitely satisfiable but contradictory sets of sentences can be built:
{〈a∗〉Bp,¬Bp, [a]¬Bp, [a2 ]¬Bp, [a3 ]¬Bp . . .}
The reason for lack of compactness here is the presence of the ∗ operator, which
is equivalent to a disjunction of countably many formulas. On the other hand,
the fact that our intended model deals with a countable number of sentences
in the agent’s language, and all of them are nameable, leads to another way
of building an inconsistent set whose each finite subset is consistent. Let →E
be the name of the modus ponens rule of inference. Then the set
S = {¬Bp, 〈→E〉Bp} ∪ {¬B(η → p) | η ∈ L}
is inconsistent. Ågotnes (2004) deals with this particular kind of compactness
failure by stipulating that the agent’s language contains a formula that is not
nameable in the external language. In that case, the set S becomes consistent.
But since in my case the other kind of compactness failure would still remain,
I don’t see any reason to adopt this measure for my system.
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2.2 Logic for a Gentzen-style reasoning agent
One reason to be dissatisfied with the system of Section 2.1 is that
there is no way to restrict the content of subproofs. For example, given F S ,
the action ¬I;¬E (indirect proof followed by double-negation elimination) is
equivalent to an arbitrary derivation Infer. In order to restrict the content
of subproofs, we would need to make the action that describes the embedded
derivation a parameter of the subproof action. But in that case, the iteration
construct turns out to be insufficiently expressive.
Besides that, we would like to use our system to describe the reason-
ing of human agents. One obstacle to doing that is that positing a particular
derivation system as the reasoning mechanism humans actually use seems un-
necessarily ambitious. We would like the logic to be flexible enough, so that it
can model various derivation systems. In principle, this seems doable. A step
in the proof according to one system may be reproduced as a number of steps
in another. So, a typical statement like
〈R∗〉Bη
which means “η is derivable by repeated use of the rule R”, would still be
expressible even if the agent’s system does not have R, but can model it as a
sequence of rules Q;S;T:6
〈(Q;S;T)∗〉Bη
Unfortunately, in the logic of Section 2.1 this strategy will not work: its
expressive power is less than it seems. It turns out that the internal structure
6This imitation would still be incomplete, because intermediate results of applying Q
and Q;S would accumulate in the agent’s state.
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of an iterated action plays no role; all that matters is what rules are mentioned
in it.
Lemma 2.2.1 For an action α, let mash(α) be the disjunction of all elemen-
tary actions (i. e., rules) mentioned in α. Then for any formula φ, 〈α∗〉φ is
equivalent to 〈mash(α)∗〉φ.
Proof: Suppose 〈α∗〉φ is true at state s. Then there is some state t such that
φ is true at t, and there is a finite sequence of states s = s0 , s1 , . . . sn = t such
that each si is connected to si+1 by α. Each of these α connections, in turn, is
decomposable into a finite sequence of elementary action connections by rules
mentioned in the definition of α. Therefore, there is a finite sequence of states
connected by elementary actions in mash(α) leading from s to t. But this is
precisely what it means for s and t to be connected by mash(α)∗. Therefore,
〈mash(α)〉φ is true at s.
On the other hand, suppose 〈mash(α)∗〉φ is true at s. This means there
is a sequence of states connected by mash(α) and leading to some t, with φ
true at t. Now we shall prove that each mash(α) link is also an α link. Every
such link is a rule action R from some state si to si+1 . We build the proof by
induction on the complexity of α.
• If α is a rule Q, then mash(Q) = Q.
• If α has the form β ∪ γ, then either β or γ contain R, and so, by the
inductive hypothesis, siJβKsi+1 or siJγKsi+1 .
• If α has the form β; γ, then, again, either β or γ contain R. Assume it’s
β. Then siJβKsi+1 by the inductive hypothesis. But since all our action
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relations are reflexive, si+1 JγKsi+1 , therefore, siJβ; γKsi+1 . Similarly for
the case where γ contains R.
• If α has the form β∗, then, by the inductive hypothesis, siJβKsi+1 , and
therefore, by definition, siJβ∗Ksi+1 . 
These considerations lead us to search for a system that would be able
to reflect the structure of derivations in greater detail. One way to do this is
to switch the agent’s inference system from Fitch-style natural deduction to
Gentzen-style. As a result, we will be able to build our actions as skeletons of
derivation trees. This, however, forces us to make both syntax and semantics
of our logic more complicated.
In our new logic GL we assume that the rules of inference have the
following form:
Γ, ζ1 ` η1 . . . Γ, ζk ` ηk Γ ` ηk+1 . . . Γ ` ηm
Γ ` θ
R
That is, whenever the conclusion is taken to follow from a set of sentences Γ,
some premises (ηk+1 to ηm) need to follow from the same set, and some (η1
to ηk) follow from the same set extended by one additional premise (different
for each subproof).
Second, we have a new notion of what an action is and how actions are
combined:
Definition 2.2.2 Let x, y, . . . be a set of action variables, distinct from every
other syntactic object we used before.
1. An action variable is an action;
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2. ε (the empty action) is an action;
3. A is an action (to be discussed shortly);
4. If α1 , α2 , . . . αm are actions, and R is a rule with m premises, then
α1 α2 . . . αm
R
is an action;
5. If α and β are actions, then α ∪ β and α; β are actions;
6. If α is an action and x is an action variable, then µx.α is an action.
Variable x is bound in that action.
We only allow closed action terms as action prefixes in formulas — where all
the action variables are bound, according to the usual definition.
The expression µx.α denotes an action that is defined recursively —
that is, an action β which is identical to α, except that all occurrences of x
within α are replaced by β itself. This bit of formalism is taken from CFDL
(context-free dynamic logic, (Harel, 1979)); I use it in order to control the
patterns in derivation trees more finely. The old iteration construct can be
defined as
α∗ ≡ µx.(ε ∪ (x;α))
We also add a new elementary formula type, Aη, meaning ‘the agent’s
attention is directed at η’.
We now need to specify the semantics for our modified logic. First of
all, the notion of state is modified.
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Definition 2.2.3 A state is a pair s = 〈Γ, η〉, where Γ is a finite set of
sentences in the agent’s internal language, and η ∈ Γ is a sentence (‘the focus
of attention’). We shall denote Γ as Γ(s) and η as A(s).
One can also add the empty set as an exceptional state where no focus of
attention exists.
Formula Aη is true at a state s whenever A(s) = η.
For a state s = 〈Γ, η〉 and a sentence ζ, we shall denote the state
〈Γ ∪ {ζ}, ζ〉 as s+ ζ.
Now we redefine the accessibility relation between states.
Definition 2.2.4 1. For an empty action, sJεKt iff s = t;
2. For the action A (refocus attention), for any Γ and any η1 , η2 ∈ Γ,
〈Γ, η1 〉JAK〈Γ, η2 〉;
3. For a rule R with m premises, actions α1 , . . . αm , and states s and t,
sJ
α1 . . . αm
RKt
iff there is an instance of R of the form




such that for each i ∈ 1 . . . k there is some ti such that (s + σζ i)JαiKti
and A(ti) = σηi , for each j ∈ (k + 1) . . .m there is some tj such that
sJαj Ktj and A(tj ) = σηj , and t = 〈Γ(s) ∪
⋃
j∈(k+1 ...m)Γ(tj ) ∪ {σθ}, σθ〉.7
7We accumulate intermediate results of subproofs without additional premises in the
final state of the proof.
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4. Accessibility relation induced by a non-deterministic choice action is the
union of relations induced by its components:
Jα ∪ βK = JαK ∪ JβK
5. Accessibility relation induced by a sequential action is the composition of
relations induced by its components:
Jα; βK = JαK ◦ JβK
6. Accessibility relation for a recursive action µx.α is computed in the fol-
lowing way.
For a relation R, let Jαx/RK be the accessibility relation for α where x is
taken to have R as its accessibility relation.
Let us build a sequence of relations Ri with R0 = ∅ and







An agent whose internal language is sentential logic could use the fol-
lowing set of natural deduction rules:






Γ ` η Γ ` ζ
Γ ` η ∧ ζ
∧I
Γ ` η ∧ ζ
Γ ` η
∧E




Γ ` η ∨ ζ
∨I
Γ ` ζ
Γ ` η ∨ ζ
∨I
Γ ` η ∨ ζ Γ, η ` θ Γ, ζ ` θ
Γ ` θ
∨E
Γ, η ` ζ
Γ ` η → ζ
→I





Our new language GS is strictly more expressive than F S . Here is a formula




It means that the agent can derive p by using a series of modus ponens steps,
and the result of the previous step always plays the role of the second premise











And this one does not:
q → p




















































Now that, using the attention mechanism, we can demand in our action
specifications that the next step in the derivation be applied to the result of
the previous step, it’s easy to prove that our current system is, at least in
general, undecidable.
We do this by converting our actions into programs for register machines
(Lambek, 1961; Boolos et al., 2002) – a variation of Turing machines. The
halting problem for register machines is undecidable.
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A register machine state is composed of a memory and a program.
Memory contains a finite number of cells (registers), each capable of holding
a natural number. The program is a finite sequence of instructions. There are
three types of instructions:
• +i n — add 1 to the contents of register i, perform instruction number
n next;
• −i n,m — if the number contained in register i is nonzero, decrease
the contents by 1 and perform instruction number n; otherwise perform
instruction number m;
• halt — stop execution.
The machine starts at instruction number 0.
We can now specify translation of register machine states into formulas
of our dynamic logic. Formulas of the agent’s internal language will correspond
to memory states of the register machine under consideration. Namely, each
memory state S = 〈x1 , . . . , xn〉 will be represented by a formula
T (S) = x1 • . . . • xn
where each xi is represented in the standard unary notation – a sequence of
xi s symbols ending in 0. Any agent’s state 〈Γ, T (S)〉 represents the machine
state S (that is, we are only interested in the formula under attention; other
beliefs play no role in our representation). A register machine program will be
encoded as an action of our dynamic logic.
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Elementary rules used in the translation will be the following:
a1 • . . . • aj−1 • aj • aj+1 • . . . an
a1 • . . . • aj−1 • saj • aj+1 • . . . an
a+,j
a1 • . . . • aj−1 • saj • aj+1 • . . . an
a1 • . . . • aj−1 • aj • aj+1 • . . . an
a−,j
a1 • . . . • aj−1 • 0 • aj+1 • . . . an
a1 • . . . • aj−1 • 0 • aj+1 • . . . an
a0 ,j
Rule a+,j represents adding 1 to the j-th register; a−,j represents subtracting
1 from it, and is only applicable to a state where the content of the register
is nonzero; a0 ,j does nothing, and it’s only applicable when the content of the
j-th register is 0.
Since these are rules, their names become actions only when given an-
other action to produce a premise. Let us write a+,j for
ε
a+,j , a−,j for
ε
a−,j ,
and a0 ,j for
ε
a0 ,j , — that is, for actions where the rules are applied to the
current focus of attention.
Translation is defined with the help of the following procedure TM (j, c),
where j is the node’s index and c, a context, is a finite set of numbers indicating
variables that are taken to be already defined. We write cj for a context
extended with j – that is, for c ∪ {j}.
• If j ∈ c, then TM (j, c) = xj . Otherwise,
• if the j-th instruction is halt, then TM (j, c) = ε;
• if the j-th instruction is +i n, then
TM (j, c) = µxj .(a+,j ;TM (n, cj))
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• if the j-th instruction is −i n,m, then
TM (j, c) = µxj .((a−,j ;TM (n, cj)) ∪ (a0 ,j ;TM (m, cj)))
Translation for the whole program is defined as TM = TM (0, ∅)
For example, consider the following machine




whose behaviour can be described as “move the contents of register 1 into
register 2”. Here is a diagram showing its state transitions:
// ONMLHIJK−, 2






Our translation procedure gives the following result for M :
TM = µx0 .((a−,2 ;x0 ) ∪ (a0 ,2 ;µx1 .((a−,1 ;µx2 .(a+,2 ;x1 )) ∪ (a0 ,1 ; ε))))
which is equivalent, after dropping unused variables and the empty action, to
µx0 .((a−,2 ;x0 ) ∪ (a0 ,2 ;µx1 .((a−,1 ; a+,2 ;x1 ) ∪ a0 ,1 )))
Starting with a state s0 = 〈{ss0 • s0}, ss0 • s0〉, the following derivation
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Theorem 2.2.5 A register machine M with initial state S halts iff the formula
A(T (S))→ 〈TM 〉> is valid (Where > is any logical truth).
Proof: by induction over elementary steps/state transitions. 
We have shown that GL is undecidable at least for some choices of L. It
is also easy to find an L where GL will be decidable (take an empty inference
system, for example). Decidability for particular interesting logics, such as
GS , remains unresolved.
2.3 Comparison to other systems
Sentence-based logics of belief are not new; a number of varieties has
been proposed over the years. In this section, I briefly discuss these logics and
point out where my contribution differs from previous work.
2.3.1 Konolige’s Deduction model of belief
Konolige (1986) builds his logic primarily as a tool for modeling belief
ascription. In this system, each agent i has an associated belief operator Bi .
32
The state of an agent is modeled as a set of sentences Bi plus a deduction
system ρ(i); Biη is considered true iff η is derivable from Bi using ρ(i).
One feature Konolige demands of his agents’ deduction systems is that
they be deductively closed. A system ρ is deductively closed if, given a set of
sentences B and sentences η and ζ, if B ` ρη and B, η ` ρζ, then B ` ρζ. Such
a restriction makes Konolige’s system static: an agent’s process of reasoning
does not change the truth values of any formulas in his logic.
Konolige proves that the logic is both sound and complete with respect
to the class of models he considers.
2.3.2 Step/Active logics
Step logics (Elgot-Drapkin, 1988) take seriously the idea that an agent’s
inferential process takes place in time. In step logics, formulas are prefixed
with integers, indicating the number of an inferential step, or a moment in
(discrete) time. A rule in step logics looks like this:
(i)φ1 , . . . (i)φk
(i+ 1)ψ
This means that an agent who believes φ1 , . . . φk at time moment i will believe
ψ at the next moment.
Such architecture of the logic has the effect that at each moment in
time every formula that can in principle be derived in one step is actually
derived by the next moment. When a certain derivation, represented in tree
form, has several branches, the moment at which the conclusion is reached
corresponds not to the size of the tree, but its depth.
Moreover, since the logic models an undirected search, in many realistic
situations the size of the agent’s belief set will grow very rapidly.
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Jago (2006, Chapter 4) presents a variant of this framework that can
model derivations employing additional assumptions.
2.3.3 Duc’s dynamic epistemic logic
In his Ph. D. thesis, Duc (2001) proposes to apply the apparatus of dy-
namic logic to inferential processes. He briefly discusses the suggestion to have
a separate action corresponding to each rule used by the agent — essentially,
my FL (pp. 28–30), but quickly dismisses this system as too complicated. He
then settles for a single modality 〈F 〉, with 〈F i〉α meaning “α is true after
some course of thought of i”. (In our logic, this modality would be expressed
as 〈Infer〉.) Duc proves that this simplified system is consistent and embeds
normal modal logics into variants of his dynamic epistemic logic.
In Chapter 5 of Duc’s dissertation a logic of algorithmic knowledge is
discussed, with Kn iα interpreted as “agent i can know α after n steps”. In
contrast to step logics, there is no assumption that at each next moment in
time, all the derivation steps that can be performed are actually performed.
2.3.4 Agotnes’s system
Ågotnes (2004) has both static and dynamic versions of his system.




S, where S is a term denoting
a finite collection of sentences.
a
S is interpreted as “The agent believes at
least the sentences in S”, while
`
S means “The agent believes at most the
sentences in S”. One can postulate that the agent’s belief sets are closed under
certain inference rules (this leads to a system similar to Konolige’s). The static
system is proved to be both sound and complete.
In the second part of his thesis, Agotnes extends the system with in-
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ference rules. Moreover, he allows the conclusion of a rule to be in another
agent’s belief box, thereby modeling communication. The conclusion describes
an agent’s (or agents’) state after the rule application. The new state may
be smaller than the initial one, thereby modeling belief revision and mak-
ing the reasoning nonmonotonic. ATL (Alternating Time Logic) is used as a
framework for expressing state changes, employing notions of group strategies
ensuring certain formulas. The expressive power of the resulting language is
immense. Still, at most it is possible to state that an agent who possesses a
given set of rules can reach a certain conclusion — eventually or in a given
number of steps. It is not possible to express how the rules should be combined
together and in what order.
2.3.5 Sentential epistemic logics by Jago
Jago (2006) develops a variety of logics where change of state represents
inference steps taken by an agent. First, he extends Active logics with ability
to handle proofs involving assumptions, obtaining a logic he calls TRL – Timed
Reasoning Logic. The mechanism is to enrich the notion of an agent’s state:
a state is taken to be a collection of contexts, with each context marked by
a set of assumptions taken in that context, and containing a set of formulas
derived using those assumptions.
Jago also considers a modal logic like that of Duc, with a step of deriva-
tion corresponding to a change from state s to an accessible state t. Unlike
Duc, the basic modality represents just one step, not a whole possible train
of derivation. Jago’s main interests lie in modeling AI agents, so he makes an
assumption, reasonable in that context, that the set of rules accessible to an
agent is finite. (In Jago’s terminology, a rule is what I call a single instance
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of a rule). Under this assumption he is able to provide a complete axiomati-
zation for his logic. A multi-agent version of the logic handles communication
between agents through a special kind of rules.
In the final chapter of his thesis, Jago combines the rule-based epistemic
logic with the TRL’s mechanism for handling assumptions. The resulting
system is able to model a reasoner that uses natural deduction. The main
difference in expressive power compared to my FL system is that there’s still
only one modality symbol; only the size of the proof is represented in the
epistemic logic’s formulas, not any particular shape the derivation might take.
In (Jago, 2009), the epistemic logic for rule-based reasoning is extended
to the case of nonmonotonic reasoning through belief revision. Again com-
pleteness is proved for the version with a limited number of rules known to an
agent.
2.3.6 Small-step dynamic epistemic logics by Velázquez-Quesada
In Chapter 2 of his Ph. D. thesis, Velázquez-Quesada (2011) intro-
duces a logic that combines the possible world setup of Dynamic Epistemic
Logic (see, e. g., Ditmarsch et al. (2007)) with syntactic information about
explicit beliefs of an agent. In contrast to Duc and Jago, Velázquez-Quesada
distinguishes inferential actions up to a rule instance. A rule application is for-
mally expressed as a deterministic model-transforming operation, in the style
of DEL. Such a fine-grained approach to rules prevents one from identifying
inferential steps using different instances of the same rule; thus, it makes no
sense to talk about iterated rule applications. On the other hand, the resulting
logic is proved to be complete.
In subsequent chapters, Velázquez-Quesada considers related logics em-
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ploying notions of awareness and belief, the latter being treated as a by-product
of a plausibility partial ordering among possible worlds (thus, an agent that
believes p can still consider ¬p possible).
2.3.7 Logic of proofs
Logic of Proofs, LP (Artemov, 1994) was developed to handle certain
problems in proof theory; initially, it was given semantics based on interpreta-
tions of arithmetic. Later, however, a different kind of semantics was provided
by Mkrtychev (1997) and extended by Fitting (2005), which is closer to the
kind of models I consider in this work. Recent publications, such as (Arte-
mov, 2004; Artemov and Nogina, 2005), use the apparatus of Logic of Proofs
for studying epistemic logic.
LP deals with proofs in a Hilbert-style system, with a number of axioms
and modus ponens as the only derivation rule. The role of modality prefixes is
played in LP by so called proof polynomials. The polynomials are composed
of proof constants and proof variables (constants represent axioms) by means
of three operators: unary !, ‘proof checker’, and binary +, disjunction, and ·,
proof application: s · t produces a proof where the formula F → G, justified
by s, is applied via MP to F , justified by t.
As we can see, · closely corresponds to our →E in GL (where the two
premises are distinguished from each other), + corresponds to our ∪. We have
no analogue to the proof checking operator !. On the other hand, LP has no
means to express iteration.
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2.4 Possible extensions
In this section I would like to sketch some ways of extending my logical
systems. Detailed investigation of these extended systems is left for future
work.
2.4.0.1 Rules for predicate logic
The format of rules described in this chapter, both for FL and GL, is
well suited for systems such as sentential logic and modal logic. Natural de-
duction systems for predicate logic do not fit this format because certain rules
(existential exploitation and universal introduction) contain the additional re-
quirement that a new constant be selected.
This is easily remedied if we consider these a kind of subproof rules (in
the Fitch-style system) or rules with an additional premise (in the Gentzen-
style system). The subproof ‘assumption’/additional ‘premise’ in this case will
not be a formula but the name of the new constant, but similarly to normal
premises they have to be discharged before the subproof is finished.
2.4.0.2 Introspection
It is interesting to consider the case where the agent’s language itself
includes the B operator and the dynamic logic modalities. Since our semantics
does not make any claim as to whether the agent’s beliefs are true or consistent,
the inclusion of such operators does not present any particular problem. It
makes sense, however, to provide the agent with an introspection ability.
Two kinds of introspection are possible. First, the agent can form






It is not possible to specify a negative introspection rule within our format.
Second, an agent can introspect his own reasoning process. In the
Fitch-style system, each simple rule of the form
ζ1 ζ2 . . . ζn
η
R
can have a corresponding introspection rule













In the Gentzen-style system, for a rule
Γ, ζ1 ` η1 . . . Γ, ζk ` ηk Γ ` ηk+1 . . . Γ ` ηm
Γ ` θ
R
one can have a corresponding introspection rule
Γ ` [O](Bζ1 → 〈α1 〉Bη1 ) . . . Γ ` 〈αk+1 〉Bηk+1 . . .
Γ ` 〈




Combined with rules for dynamic logic, each possible proof in FL or
GL may be reflected within the agent’s reasoning process.
Extra care should be taken to avoid paradoxical states — such as an
agent simultaneously believing η and ¬Bη. Introspection should thus probably
be combined with non-monotonicity and some kind of ‘repair’ rules, which fire
obligatorily upon acquiring any belief (see the next subsection).
2.4.0.3 Algorithmic derivation
The system as it is set up so far only represents what is possible for the
agent to derive. Every action in our model is reflexive; the agent can always
perform derivations on those parts of his knowledge that do not concern us.
He has, so to say, no obligation to work for us. No statement of the form [α]Bη
is going to be true in a state that does not already have η.
One way to remedy this is to introduce actions that work determin-
istically. Some may consist in application of all possible instances of certain
rules — such as simplifying all the conjunctions in the current belief state.
Others might include more complicated goal-directed behaviour; but a sensi-
ble specification of the goals is likely to make the logic much more complex
than it already is.
A more flexible approach is to enrich the language with tests, as in
standard PDL. Such tests may check whether a certain formula is believed
or whether a rule is non-vacuously applicable. Tests will allow us to build
programs as actions. For example, the action of performing all possible con-
junction simplifications would be
∧E∗;∼ ∧E?
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where the test action ∼ ∧E? only succeeds when the rule ∧E is not applicable.
2.4.0.4 Belief revision. Multi-agent logic. Communication
These topics are considered together because in all three cases I can
simply adopt solutions proposed in (Ågotnes, 2004; Jago, 2006).
First, we can drop the monotonicity requirement for the rules we use
and introduce actions that drop certain beliefs. A simple form of such actions,
discussed in (Jago, 2009), is
η1 . . . ηk
∼ ζ
R
That is, given beliefs η1 , . . . ηk are present in the agent’s belief box, the agent
is allowed to drop his belief in ζ.
Ågotnes (2004) considers a more general notion of a mechanism for
belief change; rules are just one way of specifying such a mechanism. A rule
consists of a specification of the complete belief state of an agent before the
rule is applied, together with a specification of the state after its application.
Thus, a monotonic modus ponens rule looks like this:
t t {p, p→ q}
t t {p, p→ q, q}
while a rule that allows the agent to forget the premises is specified by
t t {p, p→ q}
t t {q}
(In Agotnes’s semantics, an agent’s state after execution of the rule has to be
at or above the state described by its conclusion.)
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Switching from a single-agent setting to a multi-agent one is a matter
of multiplying the belief operators B and every rule action by the number of
agents. A model for the n-agent system will be the n-th power of the original
model; each state is an n-tuple of finite sets of sentences.
Providing agents with the ability to communicate is slightly more chal-
lenging. Following Jago (2006), we can add to the agents’ internal language
two modalities,©? ij ‘ask’ and ©̀ij ‘tell’. Whenever a formula headed by such a
modality appears as the conclusion of an agent i’s rule, the execution of such a
rule puts the formula in both agent i’s and agent j’s belief boxes. Informally,
©? ijη means ‘Agent i asks agent j whether η is true, and ©̀ijη means ‘Agent i
tells agent j that η’. For such interpretations to be sensible, the agents must








A more general approach, taken from Ågotnes (2004), is to have double
indices on rules, so that the premises of the rule have to be satisfied in the
belief state of one agent, and the conclusion is added to the belief state of
(possibly) another agent. For example, here is a rule that allows agent i to




In either case, a question arises whether actions of agents take place
in an arbitrary order, in some predefined order, or simultaneously. The first
alternative does not require any change to our semantics for the logic; the
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second can be expressed as a restriction on the form of admissible actions.
The third one requires combined elementary actions: each elementary action
becomes a tuple of n actions undertaken by the n agents present in the model.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced a family of logical languages and in-
vestigated their properties. We found that these logics allow us to specify
belief states of agents equipped with syntactic reasoning capabilities that are
inexpressible in preceding systems with similar semantics. In the following
chapters we will put this additional expressive power to work.
The more powerful of our logics, GL, is in the general case undecidable.
While logic GL seems more adequate for capturing shapes of inference,
it is also considerably more cumbersome from the notation point of view than
FL. That is why in the subsequent chapters, where I discuss applications of




Indirect speech is perhaps the clearest example of a construction where
one cannot take the meaning of its sentential complement to be just a set of
possible worlds. At the same time, unlike direct quotation, it is not possible
to maintain the position that the complement is just a string of symbols. The
string of symbols — the way the original utterance being cited was phrased, —
plays a role in the truth conditions of an indirect speech report, but indirect
speech does not require the original utterance to be reproduced in its entirety.
It is my hope that a logic of the kind introduced in Chapter 2 can serve as
a tool that allows us to link the content of the report to the content of the
utterance being reported.
The question to be resolved is: what is the relation between the original
sentence p uttered by some agent A and the report A says that q? What q’s
can be based on a given p and what p’s can serve as the source of a given q?
(I remind the reader that change of indexicals’ point of reference is not my
primary area of interest, so I ignore it.)
Of all the linguistic constructions to be discussed in this thesis, indirect
speech admits the narrowest range of operations that stand between p and q.
For this reason, I am going to use this chapter as a model for the later ones. I
will simplify the treatment as much as possible in order to expose the structure
of the argument.
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Section 3.1 tries to restrict the range of data I am working with so that
the task becomes more manageable. Section 3.2 surveys some of the previous
work that is concerned with the same problems I am dealing with. Section 3.3
lists the inferential operations that can be applied to a sentence uttered by the
original speaker in producing an instance of indirect speech. In Section 3.4 a
preliminary formal analysis is built based on observations of Section 3.3. A
more adequate analysis of indirect speech will be presented in §4.4.
3.1 Limiting the data
Before we can start working on the solution, we need to delimit the
range of data we are dealing with. There are two classes of usage that we’d
like to exclude from main consideration:
• sloppy usage;
• de re indirect speech.
Furthermore, in this chapter I only consider sentences expressible in first order
predicate logic as the content of reported utterances. Later, in §4.4, this
limitation will be lifted.
3.1.1 Sloppy usage
Differences in acceptability judgments among speakers and among con-
texts of utterance exist for almost any linguistic construction, but in the case
of indirect speech (as well as for belief reports and hearsay evidentials), the
gray area where the ascription in question does not seem definitely false, but
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rather slightly awkward, is particularly wide. While there are pairs of origi-
nal utterances and reports that everyone will agree with (John, the primary
speaker, says: It’s raining. I report: John says that it’s raining), and pairs
everyone would consider inadmissible (John says: It’s raining. I report: John
says that Quito is the capital of Ecuador), there are also many intermediate
cases. One example: at a party, John says: I am going home; I report: John
says that he is leaving.
I dislike being in a position of a language lawyer, but in order to work
with such a blurry distinction one has to sharpen it a bit. I intend to be
as strict as possible in my judgments, only allowing those sentences that are
absolutely unproblematic. In particular, I will employ the following test:
Test 3.1.1 The pair (p, q) is unacceptable if an informed observer can issue
a correction “A did not say that q, he said that q′” (for some q′ that is closer
to p than q).
3.1.2 Indirect speech de re
Indirect speech de re can be treated as anaphoric (3) or bound-variable
(4) links connecting the prejacent of indirect speech with material outside it.
(3) Peteri went away. John said that hei wasn’t feeling well.
(4) Every girli suspected that John said he likes heri .
In some works (Soames, 1989; Brasoveanu and Farkas, 2007) it is claimed
that replacing names and descriptions with coreferential names and descrip-
tions is allowed in indirect speech. Unfortunately, in the case of indirect speech
it is not possible to distinguish a de re report from a de dicto report with such
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a replacement, so I don’t include this operation in the list of what’s allowed in
indirect speech. For belief reports, I do think it is possible to derive de dicto
belief ascriptions with coreferential NP replacement; see p. 78. Such a confu-
sion, however, makes it worthwhile to discuss de re indirect speech reports in
some detail.
In the cases of anaphora, pronouns can be used not just for nominal
constituents, but for verbs as well.
(5) John says that Bill [works too much]i . Bill says the same i about John.
As for the bound variable cases, the binding operator (definite or quan-
tifier) may stay in place in the surface syntax (i. e., if we adopt the quantifier
raising theory, the raising is covert).
(6) John: Michael will come to the party.
Peter: John says that a friend of his will come to the party.
Using a theory of presuppositions in the vein of van der Sandt (1992), we can
even handle de re uses of proper names. A proper name has a binding operator
as a presupposition that rises to the outermost level of the sentence (or even
discourse), crossing the indirect speech border. A variable is left in place, to
be bound when the operator in the presuppositional part of the meaning is
accommodated.
(7) John: My favourite writer is Mark Twain.
Peter: John said that his favourite writer is Samuel Clemens.
A restriction has to be placed on this kind of name change that arises from the
strict approach to truth conditions of indirect reports outlined in the previous
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section: it is presupposed that the identity of referents referred to by the names
and/or definite descriptions used in the primary and the secondary utterances
is common knowledge among all the participants (speaker and audience) of
both speech acts. Otherwise the indirect speech report is open to the criticism:
John did not say that his favourite writer was Clemens, he said it was Mark
Twain! One can either treat examples like that as true but misleading (which
gives rise to a wide range of theories of de re speech and propositional attitude
attribution), or just declare them infelicitous, failing the presupposition.
Apart from definite descriptions and proper names, the only type of
covert quantifier raising allowed in such cases is specific indefinites. They are
specific because the secondary speaker knows the identity of the object (it was
referred to in the primary utterance).
It is a well known property of specific indefinites (Fodor and Sag, 1982)
that they don’t obey island restrictions on scope; for example, indefinites oc-
curring in the antecedent of a conditional can have scope over the whole con-
ditional:
(8) John: If Michael comes to the party, there may be a fight.
Peter: John said that if a friend of his comes to the party, there may
be a fight.
Other kinds of covert quantifier raising are disallowed:
(9) It is known to everyone involved that John has exactly three students:
Bob, Bill and Mary
John: Bob, Bill and Mary are sleepy today.
Peter: #John said that every student in his class is sleepy today.
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Similarly to cases of failed common knowledge of identity, one could perhaps
argue that quantificational de re indirect speech ascription in examples like
(9) is true but misleading. I can’t think of any test that would distinguish
between these two analyses; however the theory that such utterances are true
would carry an additional burden of explaining the intuitive false judgments,
so I prefer simply to treat the sentences as false.
It is not always a matter of choice for the secondary speaker whether to
use de dicto or de re indirect speech reports. De re reporting may be inevitable
in the following cases:
• Report is quantifying over a number of primary utterances, as in (4).
• A proper name or description used in the primary utterance is not fa-
miliar to the secondary addressee.
• Politeness. Sometimes replacing the proper name or pronoun can be
dictated by contextual factors such as official or informal situation or
hierarchical relations between participants of conversation.
(10) John: I talked to Josh today.
Peter: John says he talked to Prof. Dever today.
(11) Russian: Ivan, to Vasiliy: Petr tebja včera videl
‘Peter saw you (informal) yesterday.’
Ivan, to Vasiliy, in a more formal setting: Ja skazal, čto Petr
včera Vas videl ’
‘I said that Peter saw you (polite) yesterday.’
In such examples, shift occurs between linguistic registers within the
same language, and, as such, it has a lot in common with the shift
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between different languages (§3.3.1). On the other hand, the type of
the situation (formal or informal) can be considered a special kind of
indexical, although, obviously, it is absent from the standard Kaplanian
list of speaker, place, and time.
• The reporter may not have full information about the original utterance;
for example, when he has not heard or understood all of it.
(12) A: John . . . (mumble). . . the vase and everyone’s upset.
B: A. says that John did something to the vase.
One problem that arises in analyzing indirect speech de re is the existen-
tial commitment of wide scope quantifiers1. Let’s assume Michael is paranoid,
and thinks there is a maniac called Smith who is trying to kill him. In such a
situation, report (13) is felicitous:
(13) Michael: Smith is hiding under the table!
John: Michael says that a maniac is hiding under the table.
Under the wide scope quantification analysis, John would have to subscribe to
the existence of Smith in uttering his report, which he intuitively does not.
One could attempt to solve this by allowing replacement of coreferential
NPs in indirect speech after all, the way I do for beliefs, and treat the example
as a de dicto report. But a slight twist in the example shows that this move
fails: let us now assume that Smith is not a figment of Michael’s imagination:
he is a humble and harmless co-worker who Michael wrongly suspects of being
after him. In such a setup, (13) seems much less appropriate, even though
1Pointed out to me by Josh Dever (p. c.).
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in Michael’s belief worlds, which are to be taken into account with a narrow
scope quantification, Smith is a maniac. Note also that, unlike indirect speech
report, belief report would be felicitous in this case.
Indirect speech de re is not the main focus of our investigation, so,
having noted its existence, we concentrate on indirect speech de dicto.
3.2 Some previous work
Work investigating relations between the text of a primary utterance
and the corresponding indirect speech includes Soames (1989); Cappelen and
Lepore (1997); Brasoveanu and Farkas (2007).
Soames (1989) indicates that many propositional attitude verbs support
conjunction simplification [p. 396]. (He includes ‘say’ in this list.)
He also [p. 402] claims that propositional attitude reports preserve truth
under change of proper names. Soames uses this to motivate his theory of
structured (Russelian) propositions. He does see the problems that arise from
free use of substitution. In order to dismiss those problems, he needs to state
that “semantic facts of English are not always fully accessible to simple in-
trospection by competent speakers” [p. 419]. Since I am trying hard to avoid
just such a claim, I have to specify that certain background conditions are
to be met in order for substitution to work (see p. 47). Therefore Russelian
propositions are not an acceptable alternative for me. I will admit change
of coreferential proper names and descriptions as an acceptable operation for
belief reports in Chapter 4.
In his analysis of assertion [p. 411] Soames uses the phrase can be readily
inferred :
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“x asserts that S” characterizes the agent as having assertively
uttered a sentence S ′ in an associated context C ′, such that for
some S ′′ that can be readily inferred from S ′, the content of S ′′ in
C ′ = the content of S in the context of the report.
He never specifies what counts as such ready inference, though.
Cappelen and Lepore (1997) argue that the actual practice of speech
reporting is too unsystematic and context dependent to give any precise rules.
My approach will in fact disallow many of the examples they provide. Reports
that I do recognize as acceptable are those that will work in every context,
and survive the challenge test, as well as their test with attaching “literally”
to the report. Their work mentions most of the classes of inference that I
am going to discuss: conjunction simplification, dropping of adjectives and
adverbs, coreferential proper name substitution.
Brasoveanu and Farkas (2007) contrast indirect speech reports with be-
lief ascriptions. They emphasize the fact that, unlike belief reports, indirect
speech is always anaphoric to some particular utterance. Another condition
they claim applies to indirect speech is faithfulness to the meaning dimen-
sions : the at-issue entailments of the complement clause in an indirect speech
report should be a subset of the at-issue entailments of the primary utterance;
same for implicatures, and the presupposition/at-issue content division of the
source speech act must be preserved in the report. Among the examples pro-
vided by Brasoveanu and Farkas we see conjunction simplification, dropping of
some verb arguments (including passivization that drops the original subject),
replacing coreferential names and descriptions, certain lexical inferences, in-
troduction of presupposition-carrying operators, provided the presupposition
is known to be satisfied.
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(14) Sam: Mary visited Santa Cruz last week.
John: Jane was in Santa Cruz last week and Sam says Mary was here
too.
(here, visit L implies be at L; the presupposition-carrying too is introduced.)
(15) Sam: Sue wants a Porsche.
John: Sam says that Sue wants a car.
Such examples would be disallowed under the strict conditions of Test 3.1.1.
3.3 Inferences allowed in indirect speech
My goal in this section is to build an exhaustive list of operations that
can be applied to the text of a primary utterance when forming an instance
of indirect speech while meeting the demands of Test 3.1.1. The list clearly
depends on the somewhat arbitrary details of the task set-up; slight variations,
such as incorporating indexicals into the picture, can result in the expansion
of the list.
In forming q (in the de dicto indirect speech expression A said that q)
on the basis of an utterance p, the following operations can be applied to p:
• Translation between languages;
• Conjunction simplification;
These operations guarantee that p entails q.
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3.3.1 Translation between languages
The prejacent of indirect speech is always expressed in the same lan-
guage as the rest of the sentence (and normally, the rest of the text). If the
primary utterance to which a particular use of indirect speech refers is in fact
made in some other language, it needs to be translated.
(16) Ivan: Dvaždy dva četyre. (Two times two is four — Russian)
Peter: Ivan says that two times two is four.
Sometimes this requirement is violated, and in such cases we can speak about
a mixture of indirect speech and direct quotation (Maier, 2007; Shan, 2010).
(17) Bush said that the terrorists misunderestimated him.
Such a mixture of the primary speaker’s idiolect with the one of the secondary
speaker is possible only when they are close enough to be mutually under-
standable.
3.3.2 Conjunction simplification
Several operations can be interpreted as subspecies of conjunction sim-
plification2:
• Simple conjunction;
• Dropping veridical adverbs and intersective adjectives;
• Dropping arguments.
2For the moment I am ignoring the fact that the conjunctions in question may occur in
the scope of other operators. See §4.3.
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First, there are conjunctions as such: sentential (18) or constituent (19,
20):
(18) John: Quito is the capital of Ecuador and La Paz is the capital of
Bolivia.
Peter: John says that La Paz is the capital of Bolivia.
(19) John: Michael took off his trousers and went to bed.
Peter: John said that Michael went to bed.
(20) John: Michael drinks both beer and wine.
Peter: John says that Michael drinks beer.
Note that it is not the presence of syntactic conjunction as such that allows
simplification, but its interpretation as logical conjunction (rather than an
operation creating sum individuals)
(21) John: Michael, Bill and Bob carried the piano upstairs.
Peter: #John says that Michael carried the piano upstairs.
Second, intersective adjectives, as well as adverbs of time, place and
manner, can be dropped.
(22) John: Michael bought a red car.
Peter: John says that Michael bought a car.
(23) John: I read the paper thoroughly yesterday at home.
Peter: John says that he read the paper.
All these types of adverbs are veridical — that is, a sentence containing the
adverbs implies the sentence with adverbs dropped.
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Third, if a verb has an argument that can be dropped without change in
interpretation of the other arguments, this drop is allowed in indirect speech.
(24) John: I ate a slice of pizza.
Peter: John says that he ate.
Dropping an argument is allowed only when there are two subcategorization
frames for the verb — one containing the argument in question, the other
lacking; if the argument is normally obligatory, but can be omitted in some
specific circumstances (He hit, and hit, and hit), in indirect speech this omis-
sion is prohibited.3
(25) John: Michael hit Bill.
Peter: #John says that Michael hit.
On the other hand, if the theta-role of (at least one) of the remaining argu-
ments changes between subcategorization frames, changing the frame is, again,
prohibited.
(26) John: Michael broke the window.
Peter: #John says that Michael broke.
Peter: #John says that the window broke.
Let us adopt a neo-Davidsonian representation where every verb has
an event argument, and both syntactic arguments and adverbs are represented
by means of predicates corresponding to theta-roles of the arguments and to
adverbs. Thus, the sentence
3Nick Asher, p. c.
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(27) Michael ate a sausage slowly.
would be represented as
∃e.∃x.(sausage(x) ∧ eat(e) ∧ Agent(e) = m ∧ Patient(e) = x ∧ slow(e))
It is easy to see that under such a representation all the operations considered
in this subsection become special cases of conjunction simplification.
Nick Asher (p. c.) suggests that the fact only non-obligatorily expressed
arguments are allowed to be dropped is evidence that representation in the
style of original Davidson’s account is preferable which equips the verb with
an event variable, but keeps all the arguments together:
(28) Michael hit Bill.
∃e.hit(e,m,b)
In my opinion, the evidence is inconclusive, since the impossibility of expres-
sions like Michael hit can be caused by purely syntactic restrictions.
Note that three of the mentioned prohibited cases: conjunction simpli-
fication when conjunction denotes a sum individual, nonveridical adverbs, and
argument dropping when it leads to change in the theta-roles of the remaining
arguments, do not preserve entailment.
3.4 Formal presentation
We now try to characterize the inference rules one can use in form-
ing the prejacent of an indirect speech construction. Unfortunately, there is
no way to do this for translation into another language without complicating
the system considerably. On the other hand, if we assume neo-Davidsonian
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representation of the prejacent, three kinds of simplification (conjunction sim-





Rules used in indirect reports will typically have to be applied within
the scope of one or more operators such as quantifiers or conditionals; more-
over, applicability of the rules depends on the context where the premise is
located within the formula. I delay discussion until §4.4; in that section, I will
also be able to handle a much wider fragment of the language (including, for
example, subsective adjectives and focus operators).
To capture the meaning of indirect speech, we need, first, to introduce
quantification over utterances (over sentences with resolved indexicals) — since
indirect speech is only true when a primary utterance exists, but does not
allow us to reconstruct that utterance completely. Second, we need a way to
specify that a certain sentence/formula is derivable given a certain premise.
In building a translation of indirect speech into formal language, I use modal
necessity — if one explicitly believes p, one will always be able to derive q
using certain inference rules. With these details taken into account, I give the
following semantics to indirect speech:
JA says that qK = ∃p (say(A, p) ∧(Bp→ 〈∧E∗〉Bq))
3.5 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, I have applied my general framework to build a model
that can predict certain entailment relations between sentences uttered by a
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primary speaker and sentential complements of indirect speech constructions.
This account is deliberately narrow in scope: whenever it predicts an indirect
speech expression is allowed, it should be allowed irrespective of contextual
factors; but many instances of indirect speech that actually occur are not
predicted.
As soon as we lift the artificial restriction that the contents of the re-
ported utterance be expressible in the first order predicate logic, more classes
of operations on those contents becomes evident. One is dropping focus oper-
ators like even, only, clefts and pseudo-clefts.
(29) John: It was George who ate the watermelon.
Peter: John says that it was George who ate the watermelon.
or
Peter: John says that George ate the watermelon.
(30) John: What George did was eat the watermelon.
Peter: John says that what George did was eat the watermelon.
or
Peter: John says that George ate the watermelon.
(31) John: Only Michael solved the problem.
Peter: John says that Michael solved the problem.
(32) John: Even Michael solved the problem.
Peter: John says that Michael solved the problem.
Note that in (31) the complement of indirect speech is a presupposition of the
original utterance (and even the fact that there is such a presupposition is
being debated, see e. g. (Horn, 1996; Beaver and Clark, 2008) for contrasting
viewpoints). This presents a problem for the account of Brasoveanu and Farkas
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(2007), which requires the presupposition/at issue distinction of the original
utterance to be retained in the indirect speech.
Similarly, once the restriction on utterance content is dropped, we no
longer need to restrict ourselves to intersective adjectives, but we still need
the adjective to be subsective:
(33) John: Michael is a good surgeon.
Peter: John says that Michael is a surgeon.
(34) John: Michael offered shelter to an alleged criminal.
Peter: #John says that Michael offered shelter to a criminal.
Note that an inference with a non-subsective adjective would fail to be truth-
preserving.
This chapter concentrated on the verb to say ; it is a question for fu-
ture investigation whether other verbs of speech behave in the same way and
whether they admit the same inferences. In particular, the verb tell is worth
studying, as well as verbs of assertion like claim and assert itself.
Another topic where the approach of this chapter has to be extended
is indirect questions (and the verb to ask). In order to describe which trans-
formations are allowed there, we need to speak about entailment relations
between questions (Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1988) and inferences performed
on questions.
This chapter is mostly based on my own acceptability judgments. While
intuitions with respect to truth conditions of indirect speech are inevitably




This chapter deals with belief ascriptions. Our task for analyzing this
type of constructions is: what sentences p does an agent A need to have in his
belief box in order for the ascription A believes that q to count as true?
This kind of task is somewhat more problematic than it is in the case of
indirect speech since there the primary utterance p is always, at least in prin-
ciple, publicly accessible. Explicit beliefs — sentences stored in the speaker’s
mind, — that play the same role in belief ascriptions are not public and typi-
cally it is not as easy to determine whether a given belief is present as a stored
Mentalese sentence in one’s mind — even for the agent himself. The following
circumstances will be considered reliable enough evidence that (translation of)
p is explicitly present in A’s belief box:
• Sincere assertion of p by A. We assume that we can determine whether
a given assertion is sincere.
• A hearing an assertion of p and accepting it. Again, it is assumed that
we can recognize when A accepts p and distinguish it from cases where
he disbelieves it but does not bother arguing against it, etc.
• A explicitly believing q such that p is a presupposition of q:
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(35) John: Bill stopped smoking.
∴ John believes that Bill used to smoke.
In real life, of course, there are many more cases where a certain explicit belief
is ascribed. Suppose Bill is John’s best friend, John normally uses the name
‘Bill’ to refer to Bill, and Bill stands right before John, with nothing obscuring
the view. It seems reasonable to ascribe to John the explicit belief I see Bill.
However even in such cases it is hard to determine exactly which of a number
of non-equivalent internal sentences John possesses (maybe it’s Bill is standing
before me or even Bill looks tired today), so we will try to avoid such cases in
our examples.
Similarly to indirect speech, there is a large amount of sloppiness in
ascribing beliefs, and that leads to a wide gray area where it is not clear
whether a given ascription is warranted. Here, as there, we might want to
distinguish between false ascriptions and ascriptions that are technically true
but misleading. Again, as in the case of indirect speech, I take the narrowest
possible position, applying the following test:
Test 4.0.1 Explicit belief in p by an agent A serves as a justification for the
belief ascription of q only if “A explicitly believes that p but does not believe
that q” is a contradiction according to our pre-theoretical intuitions.
Again, as in the case of indirect speech, we need to acknowledge the existence
of de re belief ascriptions, even if we do this only to indicate that they are not
the primary object of our attention. Rules for forming such ascriptions are
the same as in the indirect speech case. Moreover, in English propositional
attitude reports can have a syntactic frame unavailable in indirect speech and
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specialized for de re (and de se, if one takes this kind of belief ascriptions to
form a separate class) ascriptions:
(36) John believes (wants, etc.) himself to be smart.
(37) ∗John says himself to be smart.
This chapter starts by reviewing various approaches to analyzing belief
in Section 4.1. Section 4.2 presents a list of the inferential operations that
belief ascriptions support. Some of those operations are sensitive to mono-
tonicity features of their enclosing environment, as discussed in Section 4.3,
which introduces a variant of a system called Natural Logic. This, in turn,
allows me to improve my presentation of the indirect speech construction. I do
this in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 examines the remaining problems with my ac-
count. Section 4.6 is a list of examples collected from previous works on belief
ascription. I use these examples to test my theory. Finally, Section 4.7 makes
my account more formal using the logical apparatus of the kind discussed in
Chapter 2.
4.1 Theories of belief and belief ascription
Up to this point we spoke as if it were a done deal that human minds
operate on sentence-like representations in some internal language and that
the right way to approach belief ascriptions is by investigating the properties
of those representations. In fact many philosophers disagree with this picture.
In this section we survey the alternative viewpoints.
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4.1.1 Disposition to assent
One approach takes belief to be a disposition to certain behaviour; the
easiest such behaviour that indicates belief is verbal. This leads us to the kind
of analysis presented in (Carnap, 1947):
It seems that the sentence ‘John believes that D’ in S can be
interpreted by the following semantical sentence:
‘There is a sentence Si in a semantical system S
′ such
that (a) Si in S
′ is intensionally isomorphic to ‘D’ in S
and (b) John is disposed to an affirmative response to
Si as a sentence of S
′.’
(p. 61–62)
Carnap’s analysis is complicated by the fact that John might speak a different
language from the language of the reporter, but essentially belief in ‘D’ is
ascribed to John iff he is disposed to respond affirmatively to ‘D’.
One who takes this position will be led to some particular answers to
related questions. First, the object of belief, if there is any, turns out to
be a natural language sentence; that is, beliefs are subject to extremely fine
individuation conditions. Second, this analysis in itself predicts no systematic
correlation (a) between beliefs in different sentences, and (b) between belief in
a certain sentence and extra-linguistic behaviour of the believer. Explaining all
such systematicity would presumably be a task for biology, neurophysiology,
psychology or some other empirical science, not philosophy.
Beliefs are central to epistemology and philosophy of language. Pre-
sumably these areas should enjoy some independence from the latest findings
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in psychology or neurophysiology. Moreover, science in general is concerned
with obtaining knowledge, and knowledge is typically considered a kind of be-
lief. A logical circle arises (albeit a rather large one, so it may be acceptable
to some).
There is a smaller circularity. Dispositions to a certain response only
count given a background assumption of the speaker’s sincerity. But what is
it to be sincere? One answer immediately comes to mind: A is sincere iff A
believes what he says. Unless an alternative account is produced, the sincerity
condition itself depends on the analysis of belief.
Even if one does not take disposition to assent to be a proper analysis
of A believes that p, one can regard such a disposition as a reliable test whether
A believes p. That is, instead of constitutive role, we ascribe evidential role to
dispositions to verbal behaviour. For example, in (Kripke, 1979) we find the
‘strengthened disquotational principle’:
A normal English speaker who is not reticent will be disposed to
sincere reflective assent to ‘p’ if and only if he believes that ‘p’.
Counterexamples have been proposed to this principle. They concern
the ‘only if’ direction of the biconditional — incidentally, the direction that
Kripke himself took to constitute the weaker disquotational principle1. One
is due to Powers (1978) and concerns puzzles — cases where the answer is
‘obvious’ once shown to the subject answering the puzzle, but hard to find
otherwise. (Powers’s own example is ‘Is there a word consisting of 4 letters
1‘Misdisquotations’ from (Moore, 1999) can serve as counterexamples in both directions.
But these examples depend on cases of confused identity. In this work I make the simplifying
assumption that no such confusion arises.
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that ends in E-N-Y?’ with the answer ‘DENY’). Let p be the puzzle and q the
answer to it. Then, in the normal case, an agent has a disposition to answer
‘yes’ to the question ‘Is it true that q ∧ p holds?’ (‘Is it true that DENY
is a word of 4 letters ending in E-N-Y, and there is a word of 4 letters that
ends in E-N-Y?’), but not to ‘Is it true that p holds?’. Thus, according to the
disquotation principle, we would need to ascribe to the subject belief in q ∧ p,
but not in p. This runs counter to many people’s intuitions (although Powers
himself accepts this as a result).
Another counterexample was presented by Audi (1982). An excited
speaker is telling a story to his table companions. If he were asked whether
his voice is too loud, he would immediately realize that it is. Thus, using the
disquotational principle, we would have to assign to him the belief My voice
is too loud ; this result seems counterintuitive.
Here’s one more problematic case. An opinionated man (Lycan, 1985)
never admits that he does not know the answer to a question; instead, he says
“yes” or “no” based on some information unrelated to the subject matter of
the question (for example, on the output of a random number generator). A
quick sincere assent of the opinionated man cannot serve as an indication of
prior belief.
As for the ‘if’ direction (if a normal English speaker believes ‘p’ and
is not reticent, he will be disposed to affirm ‘p’ on reflection), I consider it
a good test, a necessary condition for ascribing belief. I will use it to argue
against certain theories of belief. (Of course, one might instead accept these
theories and reject the principle.) Violations of this principle have a somewhat
Freudian flavour: we know you are disposed to deny the truth of p (‘I should
marry my mother’), and yet this is what we claim you believe (and perhaps
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the very intensity of your denial serves as additional evidence that you do in
fact believe p).
4.1.2 Interpretationism
One would like to use the whole gamut of behavioural dispositions of
an agent, not limited to linguistic ones, in ascribing beliefs to that agent.
However such an approach demands a holistic viewpoint, since no belief by
itself determines what the agent is likely to do; it does so only relative to
other beliefs and desires.
This leads to the following analysis of belief and desire:
To desire that P is to be disposed to act in ways that would tend
to bring about that P in a world where one’s beliefs, whatever
they are, were true. To believe that P , is to be disposed to act in
ways that would tend to satisfy one’s desires, whatever they are,
in a world in which P (together with one’s other beliefs) were true.
(Stalnaker (1984), p. 15)
Stalnaker (1984) argues that functionalism (defined by him as the view accord-
ing to which a mental state is individuated by its actual and potential causal
relations to stimuli, behaviour and other mental states) inevitably leads to an
extremely coarse grained individuation conditions for belief. In his opinion,
given an agent’s desires, his actions and dispositions to act can only distin-
guish beliefs up to their truth conditions. Therefore, a belief state can be
represented by a set of worlds that the agent regards as (epistemically) pos-
sible. A belief ascription would then indicate that in every world of the A’s
belief state p holds. Thus the object of a belief verb is a set of possible worlds.
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Taking belief states to be model-theoretic constructions such as sets of
possible worlds has the advantage of simplicity: the meaning of other construc-
tions (such as modals, intensional adjectives and verbs2) is analyzed using the
same basic machinery, so why not apply it to propositional attitudes as well?
Moreover, modal logic is a highly developed and well understood discipline.
It would be beneficial to be able to apply its results to the analysis of belief
states.
Fischer (1985) considers Stalnaker’s arguments for coarse-grained anal-
ysis of belief states and concludes that it is not in fact entailed by the function-
alist approach. He shows that Stalnaker’s argument either uses an implausible
formulation of the functionalist definition of belief, or, when a more intuitively
correct definition is used, involves quantifying into opaque contexts as well as
circularity.
Another consideration makes the combination of functionalism and
coarse grained individuation of beliefs implausible. If A is able to speak and
desires to be truthful, it is possible that he would assent to a sentence p, but
would fail to assent to another sentence q with the same truth conditions.
Thus, it would seem, A is disposed to act in such a way as to fulfil his desires
provided that p is true, but not provided q is true. Either we should individ-
uate beliefs finely enough to distinguish the proposition expressed by p and
one expressed by q, or ascribe irrationality to A. As soon as we include verbal
behaviour as one of the components that determine belief individuation, it is
hard to maintain the coarse grained position.
Moreover, the most straightforward application of an approach based
2At least some of these, such as search, should be analyzed in the same way as proposi-
tional attitudes.
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on sets of possible worlds leads to counterintuitive results, namely the logical
omniscience problem. An agent that believes a proposition p thereby believes
all its logical consequences. In particular, necessary truths, such as true math-
ematical statements, are believed by all agents. It is also impossible to have
different attitudes to two logically equivalent statements. Clearly agents in
the real world do not have these characteristics.3
Several strategies have been attempted in order to overcome this dif-
ficulty. First, it can be claimed that the possible world analysis gives us the
notion of ‘implicit belief’. But implicit belief seems to play no role in explain-
ing and predicting the agents’ behaviour (at most, it can play a normative role,
telling us how agents should act). In order to be useful for these purposes, the
implicit belief theory should be supplemented, if not replaced, by an account
of explicit belief, and what the natural language expression to believe denotes
is much closer to explicit than implicit belief.
To avoid closure under logical consequence, one can claim that an
agent’s belief state consists of multiple substates. Each substate is a set of
possible worlds (and thus beliefs in this substate are closed under logical con-
sequence), but the substates may be mutually incompatible, and the process
of reasoning is required in order to combine them. (This is the position ad-
vocated by Stalnaker (1984). A logic based on this ‘society of minds’ idea is
presented in Fagin and Halpern (1988)). However, in order to prevent logi-
cal consequences from being believed, one would have to posit an indefinite
number of such substates. In particular, should we place every axiom of a
mathematical theory in a separate substate? And, assuming some theory is
3Whitsey (2003) is an excellent survey of various approaches to logical omniscience. See
also Fagin et al. (2003, Chapter 9)
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finitely axiomatizable, once an agent deduces a theorem that uses all of the
axioms (such as a simple conjunction of the axioms), should he therefore come
to believe every other theorem?
Another strategy is to use nonstandard modal logic. In addition to
possible worlds where the logical laws hold, models of such logics can include
nonclassical (impossible) worlds, where the truth value of every formula is
determined separately, without any connection to the values of its subformulas.
This kind of models was proposed by Rantala (1975).
Still another approach is to supplement the standard modal theory
of implicit belief with a mechanism that selects some syntactic structures as
believed explicitly. Each world is associated (via a function Ai(w) for each
agent i) with a set of formulas that the agent is aware of in that world. The
agent explicitly believes a formula φ at world w iff he believes φ implicitly and
is aware of φ at w:
(M,w)  Aiφ iff φ ∈ Ai(w)
(M,w)  X iφ iff (M,w)  K iφ and (M,w)  Aiφ
(4.1)
This approach is taken by Fagin and Halpern (1988) in their logic of general
awareness.
The impossible worlds approach and the logic of awareness turn out to
be equivalent in their expressive power (Wansing, 1990; Fagin et al., 2003).
In both cases, one can place restrictions on the set of admissible structures to
ensure that certain regularities in belief ascriptions are met. For example, in
the logic of awareness, in order to make beliefs closed under conjunction sim-
plification, one can require that the awareness function respect the condition
if φ ∧ ψ ∈ Ai(w), then φ ∈ Ai(w) and ψ ∈ Ai(w) (4.2)
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In both cases, ‘purely semantic’ interpretation rules using possible worlds and
accessibility relations are augmented with ones that directly refer to the syntax
of formulas. In both cases there are no resources for the additional restrictions
to make a distinction between formulas that are explicitly stored in an agent’s
mind and those that are merely derivable. Therefore awareness sets/true for-
mulas in an impossible world will inevitably be deductively closed under a
limited inference system corresponding to the restrictions (for example, if (4.2)
is respected, awareness sets will be closed under conjunction simplification).
As we will see (p. 96), this is not necessarily a realistic assumption. On the
other hand, in contrast to the approach based on the type of logic introduced
in Chapter 2, logic of awareness and impossible world structures have no dif-
ficulty handling introspective beliefs.
Yet another way to make use of syntactic information is to consider
structured propositions — that is, syntactic derivation trees, where every node
corresponds to a constituent, and a set-theoretic meaning is assigned to it
(thus, sets of possible worlds are assigned to whole sentences). The objects
of belief are such structured propositions. This is the position taken in Lewis
(1970); other notable proponents are Soames (1989), Moore (1995, Chapter 5).
In this theory, it is impossible to distinguish synonymous leaf nodes (for exam-
ple, Cicero from Tully, or furze from gorse). This leads Moore to a claim that
any belief ascription involving such terms (or at least, any ascription where
substitution of such terms leads to problems) is metalinguistic (p. 116–118).
Otherwise, the structured propositions view is very similar to representational
approaches to be discussed in the next section.
The functionalist (in Stalnaker’s sense) approach ascribes belief states
on the basis of behavioural dispositions; therefore, agents with the same dis-
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positions will have the same beliefs (and desires) ascribed to them. I will now
argue that this leads to certain unwelcome results, however finely we individ-
uate beliefs.
Dennett (1975) provided an example that purports to refute representa-
tional theories of belief. (Matthews (2007) uses it as one of his most important
arguments.)
In a recent conversation with a designer of a chess-playing pro-
gram I heard the following criticism of a rival program: “It thinks
it should get its queen out early.” This ascribes a propositional
attitude to the program in a very useful and predictive way, for
as the designer went on to say, one can usually count on chasing
that queen around the board. But for all the many levels of explicit
representation found in that program, nowhere is anything roughly
synonymous with “I should get my queen out early” explicitly to-
kened. The level of analysis to which the designer’s remark belongs
describes features of the program that are, in an entirely innocent
way, emergent properties of the computational processes that have
“engineering reality”. I see no reason to believe that the relation
between belief-talk and psychological process talk will be any more
direct.
Now, there may be reasons why a program would not be disposed to answer
affirmatively to sentence D — ‘I should get my queen out early’, the most
trivial being that it might not have an interface for answering questions. But
take Harry, a human player who memorized the rules by which the program
selects its moves. Harry would certainly respond affirmatively to any sentence
72
that is explicitly represented by the program (in an appropriate mode), since
these sentences are also represented in his mind. But there is no reason for
him to affirm D. Moreover, it is easy to imagine that the program has a rule
‘I should not get my queen out early’, but the rule’s weight in influencing
the program’s behaviour is too low, and in a real game it is always trumped
by other rules. Still, in such a setup Harry will in fact be disposed to affirm
the negation of D. Therefore, Dennett’s example fails the test based on the
disquotation principle. Suppose now that the proponent of the interpretative
theory insists on ascribing the queen-should-be-out belief to the program, since
it does predict all its relevant behaviour, but avoids ascribing it to Harry, since
his linguistic behaviour is inconsistent with this belief. But now, let us imagine
poor Harry has a stroke and loses all his linguistic abilities, retaining his chess-
playing abilities. The theorist would have to say that the stroke caused him to
acquire the queen-should-be-out belief, since now his behavioural dispositions
are indistinguishable from the program’s in any relevant way. I find this result
highly counterintuitive.
The designer’s ascription was ‘useful and predictive’, as Dennett puts
it. This does not prevent it from being erroneous. Notice, by the way, that
the designer in question ascribed beliefs to a rival program, not to his own
creation. Dennett does not specify whether the designer had any idea what
information the rival program represented explicitly. As for the usefulness of
the ascription, a person who does not know enough physics will find it useful
to ascribe to stones a desire to be as close to earth as possible. The ascription
would still be wrong.
Another case that fails the disquotation principle is knowledge of lan-
guage. A näıve speaker might not respond affirmatively to a sentence ‘The
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subject in declarative sentences of English goes before the verb’, even though
he follows such a rule in his speech. This observation pushes us into denying
that a speaker believes the rules of his language. Let me try to justify this.
It is doubtless a part of ordinary usage to say that a person knows a lan-
guage. But in this kind of expression the object position of the verb to know
is occupied by a thing — a language, not by a proposition. This use of know
cannot be analyzed as true belief, or at least not as directly as for knowledge
of propositions.4 As for statements such as ‘English speakers know such and
such rule of English grammar’, these are obviously part of professional jargon;
it takes some effort for a näıve speaker to learn such a use of know. It is not
clear to me that such statements are strong indicators that correct use of a
given rule should be considered belief in that rule. Again, one often finds cases
where a native speaker believes in some rule of normative grammar (such as
prohibition to split infinitives), is disposed to affirm the rule when asked, but
violates it in his own speech.
4.1.3 Representationalism
Another approach to analyzing belief and belief attributions relies on
a hypothesis that agents capable of belief operate on a sentence-like symbolic
representation of propositions in their minds. The language of such repre-
sentation is often called Mentalese. Perhaps the most famous defense of this
view is Fodor (1975); another exposition can be found in Moore and Hendrix
4Some languages have two distinct verbs translated as know, one for knowing proposi-
tions, another for ‘being acquainted’ with objects and people. At least in one such language,
Dutch, it is the second verb (kennen) that is used for knowing languages, rather than the
first (weten). While having different translations in another language is by no means a
decisive argument for ambiguity, it at least makes such ambiguity somewhat more plausible.
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(1979).
The proponent of such a theory has to specify how Mentalese sentences
get their truth conditions; one approach that seems satisfactory in this respect
is due to Crimmins (1992) and involves the notion of normal concepts (p. 97).
In such a theory, an agent A believes p iff p’s translation into the
language of thought is represented in A’s mind in a certain way (one talks
about an agent’s ‘belief box’ as opposed to his ‘desire box’, and perhaps some
other boxes). The object of a belief attitude is then a sentence of the internal
language (or rather, the type of such sentences).
Individuation conditions for belief under this approach coincide with
individuation conditions for sentences in the internal language. Since in belief
attributions these internal sentences have to be translated into sentences of
external natural languages, one can explain some of the regularities in belief
attributions: one internal language sentence can correspond to more than
one English sentence, and both of them will be attributable to a believer.
For example, one can assume that verbs buy and sell have the same internal
representation, and this will explain that
(38) John believes that Michael sold a car to Peter.
entail
(39) John believes that Peter bought a car from Michael.
(This is a move available, among others, to accounts of belief based on DRT,
such as Kamp (1990).)
However the number of beliefs attributable to any human agent is infi-
nite, which makes them incapable to be represented in a finite brain, unless one
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adopts a highly stretched notion of what constitutes a representation. Here
are some beliefs attributable to any reader of this text which are not likely to
be explicitly represented in his mind (at least on the first reading):
(40) The Eiffel Tower is more than 2 meters tall.
(41) 58901 is greater than 57632.
(42) Bicycles are inedible.
This leads us to a view that I am about to defend: beliefs we ascribe to
an agent are those that are derivable from his explicit beliefs using a certain
restricted class of inferences. This view was first stated (and rejected, from
the interpretivist positions) by Dennett (1975). A more serious defence can
be found in Field (1978), but without a clear explanation of what counts
as a simple inference. A formal presentation was built by Konolige (1986).
His theory has a particular class of inferences attributable to an agent as a
parameter. In this chapter, I attempt to fill in the value for this parameter in
the natural-language belief predicate.
One more alternative is that of Crimmins (1992). Crimmins divorces
the truth condition for A has a belief that p, which he considers to be true
only in cases of explicit beliefs, from those of A believes that p. For the latter,
his proposal is
A believes p (in way τ) just in case
it is as if A has an explicit belief that p.
He considers this superior to the ‘formation-dispositional’ accounts (those es-
sentially based on dispositions to assent) and ‘simple consequence’ accounts,
such as Field’s. According to Crimmins, A believes that p is true iff adding
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p to the set of A’s explicit beliefs would not change his cognitive dispositions
(apart from some irrelevant changes such as introspection concerning explicit
beliefs and micro-changes in reaction times).
One advantage of this proposal is that it at the same time makes ex-
actly as much distinction between mental states as it is useful for predicting
behaviour and does so respecting all the fine granularity of the representational
account.
In my work, I am primarily interested in the construction A believes
that p; I feel A has the belief that p is mostly used in technical talk (even
though, of course, it did exist before this way of technical talk developed). As
such, philosophers’ intuitions about truth conditions of the latter construction
are too easily swayed by one’s preferred theory. If Crimmins only recognizes
explicitly represented beliefs as objects, I am content with that.
As for the as if approach to tacit belief ascriptions, even if it is the
right analysis, in order to make any predictions about truth conditions of belief
sentences it needs to be supplemented by a theory which tells us exactly what
internal sentences are such that, even though A does not have them as explicit
beliefs, it is as if he had. In other words, one still needs to know how an agent’s
mental state can be extended without influencing his relevant dispositions.
And to do that, one has to say which explicit-belief producing operations count
as “easy enough”. Even though characterizing the class of allowed inferences
no longer counts as conceptual analysis (which is now provided by the as if
theory), it remains a useful endeavour. In order to capture regularities in belief
ascriptions, one has to build a model for deriving explicit beliefs.
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4.2 Inferences in belief ascription
Agents — human and otherwise — differ in their inferential capabilities.
Whenever one ascribes a belief in p to another agent A, one needs to be sure
that A is able to derive p quickly and reliably. At a minimum, this has the
consequence that inferences one is prepared to make on A’s behalf should be
decidable.
Similarly to §3.3, in this section I aim to build as complete a list of
such inferences as possible.
It seems to me that, at least with respect to human believers, the
following regularities in belief ascription exist:
• [Conjunction simplification]: If A believes that p ∧ q, then A believes
that p and A believes that q. This covers all the cases described in the
previous chapter, namely simple conjunction, dropping veridical adverbs
and dropping optional arguments. In the following examples, John’s
words should be interpreted as a sincere assertion.
(43) John: La Paz is in Bolivia and Quito is in Peru.
∴ John believes that Quito is in Peru.
(44) John: It is raining heavily today.
∴ John believes that it is raining.
(45) John: Peter ate three slices of pizza.
∴ John believes that Peter ate.
• [Coreferential replacement]: If A believes that Fb and believes b = c
(where b and c may be either proper names or definite descriptions),
then A believes that Fc.
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(46) Background: John knows that Suzie is Bill’s (only) sister.
John: Suzie is at the movies.
∴ John believes that Bill’s sister is at the movies.
One should distinguish between de re belief ascriptions and application
of coreferential replacement to de dicto belief reports. Whatever truth
conditions philosophical theories assign to Lois Lane believes that Clark
Kent can fly, pre-theoretically this sentence counts as false, and said
philosophical theories have to argue at length that our pre-theoretical
intuitions need to be ignored in this particular case. There is no compa-
rable difficulty when drawing the inference in (46).
The identity between b and c should be prominent enough for the be-
liever; roughly, if we adopt something like Kamp’s theory of proposi-
tional attitudes (Kamp, 1990), b and c should be part of the information
stored in an internal anchor. Thus, even if John knows that the inventor
of bifocals and the first Postmaster General are the same person (with
neither description being for him a primary way of referring to Benjamin
Franklin), Test 4.0.1 may still fail, i. e.
(47) John believes that the inventor of bifocals was a gifted engineer
but he does not believe that the first Postmaster General was a
gifted engineer.
may be true.
• [Existential introduction]: If A believes that Fo, then A believes that
∃xFx.
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(48) John: Peter is bald.
∴ John believes that there are bald people.
One should distinguish existential introduction forming a de re belief
report describing a belief about a certain object: There are people John
believes to be bald, from ascribed belief in an existential, as in (48).
Some restrictions will be placed on applicability of this inference (see
p. 91).
• [Scalar inferences]: If A believes that o is at least at a point n on a
certain scale, and m is less than n, then A believes that o is at least at
a point m on that scale.
(49) John: Peter is more than 2 meters tall.
∴ John believes that Peter is more than 1.80 tall.
• [Subtyping]: Inferences based on subtyping: if A believes that o belongs
to the class C, and C is a subclass of D, then A believes that o belongs
to D:
(50) John: Demyan is a cat.
∴ John believes that Demyan is an animal.
I assume here that certain subclass relations are part of the ontology
dictated by the conceptual system reflected in the language; everyone
who possesses the subclass concept D knows that it is a subclass of C.
The subtyping rules can be seen as a special case of the rule of universal
exploitation: the statement that cats are a subtype of animals entails
that every cat is an animal; after that, we derive “Demyan is an animal”
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from “Demyan is a cat”. However it makes sense to isolate subtyping
as a separate rule, since not every instance of universal exploitation is
permissible when deriving other people’s beliefs.
• [Lexical inferences]: The previous item concerns lexical elements used to
express the belief — lexemes that stand in a subtype-supertype relation.
There are certain other lexical inferences one is allowed to make on behalf
of the believer.
(51) John: Bill sold a car to Peter.
∴ John believes that Peter bought a car from Bill.
(52) John: Peter killed Tom.
∴ John believes that Tom died.
• [‘Internal perception’]: It is unlikely that all beliefs are represented in a
linguistic or language-like form. Some will be stored as maps or images,
or some other way of representation. Producing an internal sentence on
the basis of such representation is not inference in the usual sense, but
postulating such an operation is necessary to explain some of beliefs we
want to ascribe to agents. One example of this is needed in the DENY
puzzle: surely every literate English speaker has a belief The word DENY
ends in E-N-Y, but this belief is not stored as a sentence. Rather, when
a need arises to make this belief explicit, one can imagine the spelling
of the word and check what letters are involved; this process resembles
perception of a word written on a sheet of paper.
• [Inference from ignorance]: In certain cases, absence of information to
the contrary (that is, ¬p) is sufficient to ascribe to the agent belief that
p.
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(53) John believes that snow does not turn red when it touches the
ground.
All the inferences in the foregoing list survive the absurdity test; for
example, in the case of (48),
(54) John believes that Peter is bald but he does not believe that there are
bald people.
feels inconsistent to me, at least if John is a human. By extension, however,
beliefs are ascribed to cognitive agents other than humans, such as computer
programs. The ascriber may well know that such an agent, even though its
internal representational system is rich enough to have certain beliefs, lacks the
power to perform the required inferences. Thus, if John is indeed a computer
program that lacks the mastery of existential introduction, (54) may turn out
to be true. It is a matter of lexical semantics to decide whether such use of
believe employs the same standard sense of the word or if it is a metaphorical
extension. If we decide to take the former route, regularities in belief ascription
will not be part of the lexical meaning for believe, but rather a matter of
common-sense psychology. If we choose the second option, regularities will be
analytic. In my opinion, they are worth describing regardless of our decision.
4.3 Natural logic
Inference types listed in the previous section, as well as inferences al-
lowed in indirect speech reports, apply to subordinated clauses as well. How-
ever in certain positions the direction of entailment is reversed. Thus, we
have entailment in ‘positive’ positions, as in (55) and (56), and in ‘negative’
positions, as in (57) and (58):
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(55) John believes that if it starts to rain, the road will be wet and slippery.
∴ John believes that if it starts to rain, the road will be slippery.
(56) John believes that every farmer owns a cow.
∴ John believes that every farmer owns an animal.
(57) John believes that if we buy another table, there will be too much
furniture in the apartment.
∴ John believes that if we buy another table and a sofa, there will be
too much furniture in the apartment.
(58) John believes that all computers are unreliable.
∴ John believes that all Macs are unreliable.
Of course, the entailments between the contents of beliefs are explained by
positive or negative monotonicity of various operators. My point here is that
employing such monotonicity considerations is allowed on behalf of other be-
lieving agents (at least up to a certain degree of sentence complexity).
A system (or rather a family of closely related systems) called Natural
Logic is well suited to capturing exactly this kind of entailments. Natural logic,
as a rule, uses syntactic trees of natural language sentences (see, for example,
Zamansky et al. (2006)). Every type τ of constituents in the grammar is
equipped with a partial order 4 τ (4 should be read as “less general than”);
one can derive whether two elements of a given type stand in this relation by
looking at whether this relation holds between their subconstituents. For the
type of sentences, t, the partial order 4 t is interpreted as entailment.
In this work, however, I use neo-Davidsonian logical formulas as the
internal representation of natural language sentences. This is done primarily
out of convenience, because there is very little, if any, data on what the actual
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internal language of thought might look like. The language of such formulas
has an extremely simple syntax and an uncomplicated type system. Thus the
task of building a deduction system for this language in the style of natural
logic is much simpler than for any actual natural language.
In first order logic, there are just three kinds of expressions — object-
denoting (constants and, if allowed, free variables), predicates and formulas.
Object-denoting expressions are not comparable in generality.5 Predicates of
the same arity can be compared (adore 4 like), and 4 for formulas is defined
on the basis of 4 for predicates using the following rules:
φ 4 φ N-Refl
φ 4 ψ φ 4 χ
φ 4 χ
N-Trans
P n 4 Qn
P n(c1 , . . . , cn) 4 Q
n(c1 , . . . , cn)
N-Pred
φ ∧ ψ 4 φ N-And1 φ ∧ ψ 4 ψ N-And2
φ1 4 φ2 ψ1 4 ψ2





φ2 4 φ1 ψ1 4 ψ2
φ1 → ψ1 4 φ1 → ψ2
N-Cond
d1 = d2 4 d1 ≤ d2 N-Eq
5I assume that degrees are objects, and that degrees with the same unit of measurement




c ≤ d1 4 c ≤ d2
N-Neq1
d1 ≤ d2








Some of these rules deserve a short comment. N-And1 and N-And2 take care
of everything that translates as conjunction into our representation, including
intersective adjectives, relative clauses and argument dropping. Unfortunately,
subsective adjectives are not representable in first-order language, so this logic
cannot deal with them. Once we extend the language, we would need an
extension of the logic; the system would then perhaps be closer to that of
(Zamansky et al., 2006), with its types annotated for monotonicity of functions,
rather than to this simple sketch.
As for degrees, I assume that expressions like ‘John is less than two
meters tall’ translate as ∃d(tall(j, d)∧d ≤ 2m). That is, d is the exact degree
to which John is tall. There is an unlimited supply of degree constants for each
unit of measure (natural numbers, for counting quantities of discrete objects,
are just another unit of measure). Using degrees, we can take care of all the
scalar inferences.
Let us see how specificity relations between sentences (represented as
formulas) can be derived. A derivation of ‘Every student whom Mary touched
smiled’ 4 ‘Every student whom Mary kissed smiled,’ that is,
∀x((student(x) ∧ touch(m, x))→ smile(x))
4
∀x((student(x) ∧ kiss(m, x))→ smile(x))
is presented on Figure 4.1.1 (compare Zamansky et al. (2006, p. 285)) (Here I




















































































































































































































































































































































































































them in a neo-Davidsonian fashion, in order to increase readability.) Another
example, involving degrees, is presented on Figure 4.1.2.
Partial order between elementary expressions of the language represents
relations between concepts; these statements are analytic truths accessible to
all agents.
Lexical inferences other than subtyping can be added as meaning pos-
tulates:
buy(c1 , c2 , c3 ) 4 sell(c3 , c2 , c1 )
kill(c1 , c2 ) 4 die(c2 )
There is a certain tension between this kind of postulates and neo-Davidson-
ianism: in neo-Davidsonian presentation the rule for buy and sell will look
something like
buy(e1 ) ∧ Agent(e1 , c1 ) ∧ Theme(e1 , c2 ) ∧ Seller(e1 , c3 )
4
sell(e2 ) ∧ Agent(e2 , c3 ) ∧ Theme(e2 , c2 ) ∧ Buyer(e2 , c1 )
We need to be able to recognize possible reorderings among the conjuncts, so
an additional rule is required:
φ ∧ ψ 4 ψ ∧ φ
In order to incorporate our brand of natural logic into the dynamic
logic of inferences, we stipulate that an elementary action allows an agent to
move from an explicit belief in a more specific sentence to an explicit belief in
a more general one:




It should be stressed that, apart from being a simplified toy, my system
differs from other presentations of Natural Logic in one important respect.
Typically proponents of Natural Logic aim for as broad a class of inferences as
possible; the power of the logic is only restricted by what patterns of deduction
are representable in the surface syntax of natural languages. My purpose is
to capture exactly those inferences that are used in deriving belief ascriptions,
i. e., a very limited class. For example, I don’t want to include the rule for
‘every’ from (Zamansky et al., 2006) (which allows them to perform derivations
like ‘Mary kissed every student’, ‘No student whom Mary kissed walked’ ` ‘No
student walked’), since it would take my system beyond the limits of belief
ascription.
4.4 Indirect speech, revisited
In Chapter 3, I stated that indirect speech supports dropping focus
markers and conjunction simplification as operations on its content. However
almost every conjunction, in particular when using a neo-Davidsonian internal
language, will be in scope of some quantifiers. In order to allow such an
operation, I need to resort to the same kind of Natural Logic as for belief,
with two restrictions:
1. Rules are applied only in monotone increasing contexts; this means N-
Neg is dropped and N-Cond has a simpler form:
ψ1 4 ψ2
φ→ ψ1 4 φ→ ψ2
N-Cond’
2. The lexical material used in indirect ascription should be a subset of
the material used in the primary utterance (after translation between
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languages, if any).
Both conditions are necessary, as witnessed by the inadmissibility of
the following examples:
(59) John: If Mary or Kate come, I will be happy.
Peter: ?John says that if Kate comes, he will be happy.
(60) John: Bill saw a dog.
Peter: #John says that Bill saw a dog or a cat.
In (59), restriction 1 is violated, but not 2. In (60), it’s the other way around.
This new analysis allows us to take care of the focus operators men-
tioned on p. 59. Take the case of only. Its meaning (ignoring the distinction
between presupposition and assertion) can be expressed as
Jonly a did P K = Pa ∧ ∀x(x 6= a→ ¬Px)
We can simplify this conjunction by dropping either its first or second conjunct.
If the first conjunct is retained (which corresponds to the presupposition of
the primary utterance), it can be expressed using material from the original
sentence and thus respecting condition 2.
One problem is that if we retain the second conjunct, we cannot express
it using only words from the primary utterance, thus condition 2 is violated.
But the second conjunct can be reported in indirect speech:
(61) John says that nobody but Michael solved the problem.
(I thank both Nick Asher and Martina Faller for independently overriding my
theory-laden intuitions.) This is not predicted by my current account.
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4.5 Problems
We now return to the case of belief ascriptions.
Natural Logic allows us to ascribe certain beliefs to an agent A on
the basis of some evidence about his explicit beliefs. However not all such
ascriptions will be predicted by our brand of natural logic, and not all the
ascriptions predicted by this logic are intuitively justified. We consider these
problematic cases.
First, even if individual steps in a natural logic-based inference are
unproblematic, once it becomes sufficiently long, the plausibility of belief as-
cription diminishes. Consider6
(62) John: Every girl has a small dog.
∴ John believes that every small girl has a dog.
This inference can be obtained by applying Natural Logic rules twice: first to
get
every girl has a small dog 4 every girl has a dog
and then
every girl has a dog 4 every small girl has a dog
For each of these steps, the belief ascription of the right sentence to someone
who explicitly believes the left one seems fully justified. But the inference in
(62) is already somewhat dubious. It is not hard to produce more elaborate
examples, further decreasing acceptability of the inference.
6This is based on an example from Lauri Karttunen’s talk at Texas Linguistic Society
conference 2009.
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One could appeal to the distinction between competence and perfor-
mance here. But whereas this distinction provides a way to explain why real
speakers’ grammatical judgments differ from the grammaticality prediction of
a theory that concerns idealized speakers, in our case bringing up the notion
of an idealized believer seems misguided. After all, we already have one such
notion — a logically omniscient agent of the standard epistemic logic. It makes
no sense to invent a much more complicated but still idealized construction.
Perhaps the way out is to restrict the number of applications of our
natural logic rules to two or three iterations. Luckily, our dynamic belief logic
is powerful enough for that.
Another problematic set of examples where our natural logic rules are
overgenerating concerns existential introduction. The DENY problem by Pow-
ers (see p. 65) is a case in question. Thus, while (63) is intuitively a valid
inference, (64) is not, even though they have the same structure.
(63) John believes that his best friend Peter is bald.
∴ John believes that there are bald people.
(64) John believes that DENY is a four-letter English word ending in E, N,
Y.
6∴ John believes that there is a four-letter word in English ending in E,
N, Y.
David Beaver (p. c.) suggested that a belief ascription of p to A is valid
when there is a computationally cheap algorithm for computing the truth value
of p given the explicit beliefs A has7. Of course, this idea needs a more detailed
7David points out that I misconstructed his proposal. One should only count algorithms
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specification of how the computational cost of an algorithm is evaluated and
what counts as cheap (this will inevitably be a vague notion). However in
any case it seems that the DENY case can serve as a counterexample to this
proposal. After all, one only needs to run a test over 26 instances to acquire
the belief in question, while the number of John’s non-bald friends can easily
be much larger; thus the computational cost in (63) can be higher than in
(64).
A more promising account of this problem is based on the fact that in
the DENY case the belief that serves as the base for existential generaliza-
tion is not explicit; rather, it is of the kind obtained by ‘internal perception’
(John knows how the word DENY is spelled; he can imagine it written and
count the letters). As far as I can see, all puzzles of this sort involve this
kind of translation into linguistic internal representation from a non-linguistic
medium. ‘Belief box’, the mechanism storing explicit beliefs, undoubtedly pos-
sesses some internal structure beyond a simple list of sentences assumed by our
simplistic model. This structure likely includes efficient indexing mechanisms
that allow an agent to find the needed belief quickly. Non-linguistic represen-
tations may not have such indexing; thus it is much harder to access just the
piece of information we need in order to apply existential generalization (after
transforming it into an internal-language sentence).8
One consequence of such a solution is that the inference action that will
figure in our definition of belief will not be closed under repetition — rather,
that we, humans, are wired to compute easily. In this case, I consider it my task to investigate
which particular algorithms for easy computation of beliefs we possess.
8The idea that ‘internal perception’ is involved in all puzzles is the result of a discussion
with Joey Frazee.
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it will be a disjunction of internal perception and the closure of everything else
(natural logic and inference from ignorance).
Next, we have inferences ‘from ignorance’.9 Some of these may be
handled as subtyping inferences. For example,
(65) John believes that bicycles are inedible.
can be derived using bicycle 4 mechanism and John believes that mecha-
nisms are inedible, which, in turn, one can plausibly take to describe an explicit
belief John has. However others remain problematic. As a first approximation,




It is not clear, however, for which p this rule should be applicable. Clearly not
all p-s will work (otherwise the believer would operate under a delusion of his
own omniscience). Moreover, it is clearly impossible to determine which beliefs
belong to the requisite class on the basis just of their linguistic properties –
9Inferences from ignorance are used as an argument against the deductive theory of belief
in (Lycan, 1985; Crimmins, 1992).
Moore (1985) discusses this type of problematic inferences, using them as justification for
his autoepistemic logic:
Consider my reason for believing that I do not have an older brother. It
is surely not that one of my parents once casually remarked, ”You know, you
don’t have any older brothers,” nor have I pieced it together by carefully sifting
other evidence. I simply believe that if I did have an older brother I would
know about it; therefore, since I don’t know of any older brothers, I must not
have any.
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things like cultural background should be taken into account. For example, if
Misha is a Russian with basic school-level education, one is justified in stating
(66) Misha believes that Hungarians never conquered Moscow.
At the same time, one would not be justified in ascribing the same belief to
Michael, who lives in America and does not count Russian history among his
areas of interest.




where the interpretation of K is roughly ‘A believes he would have known p
if it were true’. The ‘believes’ here should be different from the explicit belief
operator B to avoid vicious circularity. K is a meta-level operator; there
should be a computationally cheap procedure which lets A determine whether
K applies to a given sentence p.
A further, less disruptive amendment is needed because ‘would have
known’ should include tacit beliefs. I have an explicit belief that the Ostankino
tower is 540 meters tall; my belief that it is more than 10 meters tall is tacit,
derivable by a scalar inference. However I should not be able to use the Ign





where Bel denotes the action associated with belief ascriptions (which will in-




Now that my position with respect to belief ascriptions is mostly stated,
I would like to run through a list of examples that were considered problematic
by various researchers, and indicate how my theory handles them. Most of the
examples have already been mentioned, but I would like to have the whole
collection in one place to make evaluating my position easier.
• The opinionated man (Lycan, 1985). This is someone who responds
positively or negatively to questions depending on something totally ir-
relevant to the question’s content (such as weather or random number
generator results). The example is meant to serve as a refutation of
the Carnap-style dispositional theory of belief. Since our theory does
not predict belief based on disposition to assent (even though it does
treat lack of such disposition as evidence against presence of belief), the
example poses no threat to us.
• The excited speaker (Audi, 1982). A person speaks at a dinner table.
If someone asks him whether he talks too loudly, he would immediately
realize that he does and assent. Still, it is counterintuitive to ascribe
to the excited speaker the belief I am talking too loudly. Again, this is
primarily a counterexample to the dispositional theory. Realization that
the voice is too loud involves perception, which in our theory is not an
operation allowed as a step in making a tacit belief explicit.
• Quick and slow thinker (Lycan, 1985). This is an argument against a
variant of the deduction theory that allows a belief ascription of p to A if
A is able to infer p quickly enough (Lycan sees this as one of the ways to
make the theory of Field (1978) more precise). One would then ascribe
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more beliefs to an agent who is able to think faster, which, according to
Lycan, is counterintuitive. Our theory does not measure ease of inference
in terms of time, so this example poses no threat.
• Easy inference (Lycan, 1985). Another precisification Lycan proposes
for Field’s theory is to measure ease of inference as the number of proof
steps. He rightly observes that this makes the notion of belief dependent
on a particular proof system. This objection is partially applicable to
my theory. However, since it is not the number of rule applications
that counts, but patterns determining proof shape, these patterns may
well be intertranslatable between different proof systems. Moreover, the
fact that these particular patterns are able to predict the applicability of
belief ascriptions serves as evidence that the proof system used by actual
speakers at least resembles the one I employ.
• Chess program (Dennett, 1975; Matthews, 2007). See p. 71. In short, I
deny that belief ascription is true in this case.
• Puzzles (Powers, 1978). See p. 91 for the DENY example. It seems
that all the problematic cases involve internal perception followed by an
application of the existential introduction rule. I forbid this pattern of
inferences in my formal analysis. It should be noted, however, that as a
result my system is no longer closed under deduction, and ceases to be
a special case of the approach described in Konolige (1986).
• Absent-mindedness (Crimmins, 1992). A, who has put his key in his
pocket five minutes ago is now searching for it. Does he believe that the
key is in his pocket? It seems that both answers “yes” and “no” have
some support; on the one hand, the sentence The key is in my pocket
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is likely to be represented somewhere in A’s mind; on the other hand,
it does not seem to be accessible in a way that allows him to use it in
guiding his actions, including perhaps assent or dissent.
My theory does not have anything to say here that would distinguish it
from any other kind of representationalism. Most likely, the token of the
sentence in question that is represented in A’s mind does not occur in
the “belief box” — even though the way of representation is the same as
for beliefs rather than, say, desires, the contents of the belief box have to
be accessible to the believer. Note also that the disquotational principle
does not work here.
• Elder brother (Moore, 1985; Lycan, 1985). See the discussion on p. 93.
This kind of tacit beliefs represents a genuine challenge, and even though
I tried to capture the kind of reasoning needed in deriving them, I am
not satisfied with the results.
• Eaten bicycle (Crimmins, 1992). Examples like I have never eaten a
bicycle are similar to the elder brother cases (p. 93), but not as hard,
since there is at least hope to reduce them to sybtyping.
4.7 Formal presentation
The formal representation of truth conditions for de dicto belief as-
criptions is very similar to that of indirect speech. The difference is just the
type of inferences allowed. Similarly to indirect speech, quantification over
internal-language sentences is needed.
JA believes that qK = ∃p(BAp ∧(Bp→ 〈 IP ∪ Cl(N,CR, Ign)〉Bq))
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(N for natural logic derivations, CR for coreferential replacement, Ign for
inferences from ignorance, IP for ‘internal perception’.)
4.8 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, I investigated the range of inferences that are supported
in belief ascriptions. These are derivations that the ascriber can perform on
behalf of the believer. The derivations should be ones that are easy for humans
to perform. It should also be easy for human agents to find an inference with
a given result. To repeat, these are inferences such that for each of them,
an addition of the conclusion to the set of an agent’s explicit beliefs will not
change his behaviour (Crimmins, 1992).
The class of allowed inferences seems rather heterogenic. Together they
provide an important window at the way information is represented in human
minds and at the ways it is used. One can choose among various proposed
theories of information representation depending on how easy the proposed
representation makes it to perform inferences that are in fact easy for people.
For example, representations based on DRT with internal anchors (Asher,
1986; Kamp, 1990) make it very easy to compute conjunction simplification,
existential introduction and replacement of coreferential NPs, but not scalar
inferences.
It is instructive to compare the range of inferences for belief reports
and those for indirect speech reports.
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Indirect speech Belief reports








Existential generalization no∗ yes
Scalar inferences no∗ yes
Subtyping no∗ yes
Other lexical inferences no∗ yes
NL inferences in decreasing
contexts
no yes
Coreferential replacement masked by de re readings
(see p. 46)
yes
“Internal perception” no yes
Inference from ignorance no yes
Inference classes marked with ∗ are among those which, I think, fail Test 3.1.1
for indirect speech, but which are sometimes used in linguistic practice, and
are mentioned as valid at least in some of (Soames, 1989; Cappelen and Lepore,
1997; Brasoveanu and Farkas, 2007). Those without the asterisk are definitely
out, whichever way one chooses of precisifying the vague speaker intuitions.
Other propositional attitude verbs differ in the range of supported in-
ferences, and each of them should be studied separately. For example wish
arguably supports scalar inferences:
(67) John wishes to win more than a million in a lottery.
∴ John wishes to win more than fifty thousand in a lottery.
but not conjunction simplification:
(68) Peter wishes that he wins the lottery and that the prize be more than
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a million.




I start this chapter by introducing the topic of evidentiality (Section
5.1) and explaining why it is one of the constructions that fit the general
subject of this work. After that, two brief surveys follow: first, I provide a
sketch of the Bulgarian verb system and the place of evidential markers in
it (Section 5.2); second, I outline the current theoretical approaches to the
contribution of evidentials to the meaning of a sentence (Section 5.3). Finally,
after such an extensive introduction, I show how the theoretical apparatus of
this thesis can help enlighten what the meaning of evidential markers really is
(Section 5.4).
5.1 Evidentiality
Evidentiality is the linguistic encoding of the source of information.
In languages such as English, evidential meanings are expressed by lexical
means — adverbs like reportedly, allegedly ; some uses of the epistemic must
(von Fintel and Gillies, 2009a). In many other languages there are grammatical
morphemes expressing evidentiality. In some languages evidentiality marking
is obligatory on every independent clause; in others, such markers are optional.
Studies of evidentiality from the point of view of linguistic typology include
(Chafe and Nichols, 1986; Aikhenvald, 2004; Hrakovskiy, 2007).
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Among meanings expressed by evidential morphemes we find visual ev-
idence, auditory evidence, other sensory evidence, performative (knowledge
based on speaker’s own plans), internal perception, quotative (marking of in-
direct speech), hearsay, folklore, inference from results and inference from
reasoning (Willett, 1988; Aikhenvald, 2004). Of course, in each particular lan-
guage some of these possible sources are grouped together. The richest systems
with obligatory evidentiality coding have up to 5 distinct grammemes, e. g.
Tariana (Aikhenvald, 2004, p. 1–3), Tuyuca (Barnes, 1984), Kashaya (Oswalt,
1986)1.
Evidentiality is often an areal phenomenon, with languages that obliga-
torily express it forming contiguous regions, despite having distinct genetic ori-
gins (Aikhenvald, 2004, p. 288–299). One such region spans from the Balkans
in the West through Central Asia to Siberia in the East. In this area eviden-
tial markers tend to be historically derived from perfect morphemes. Another
large region where rich evidential systems are widespread is South America.
Evidentials appear to be a language feature that is relatively easy to borrow
from one language to another.
As the title of (Chafe and Nichols, 1986) ‘Evidentiality: the linguistic
coding of epistemology ’ clearly suggests, evidentiality is one of the most inter-
esting grammatical categories from the philosophical point of view. One can
find striking parallels between sources of knowledge recognized by philoso-
phers, such as in the Indian Nyaya tradition, and grammatical markers in
certain languages, such as the system of Cuzco Quechua (Faller, 2002) —
1For Kashaya, one could perhaps argue that two types of Inferential should be distin-
guished and/or that Visual should be counted separately from Factual, bringing the number
of grammemes up to 7.
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observation, hearsay, inference. Even if language grammars cannot serve as
reliable indications what the structure of knowledge really is, they show us
what the worldviews embodied in these languages take it to be. Similarly
to natural language metaphysics (Bach, 1986) one can meaningfully speak of
natural language epistemology, and systems of evidentials provide the clearest
window into its architecture.
The reason evidentials are interesting for my purposes is that many of
them fail to be closed under logical consequence. If a language has both a
direct observation evidential marker and a marker for inference from results,
then, upon seeing an empty bottle in John’s room, one is typically justified to
utter There is an empty bottle in John’s room-DIR, and also John drank some
wine-INFER. While the second of these utterances is made on the basis of
the same information as the first, direct evidential marker is not appropriate.2
Therefore a question arises what kind of inferences the speaker is allowed
to perform while still maintaining the direct evidential marker, and which
inferences require a switch to the inferential evidential.
The contrast between direct and inferential evidentials is, however, not
so easy to investigate. It is hard, if at all possible, to determine what sentences
in the speaker’s language of thought encode his perceptual experience, and
whether that encoding is linguistic at all.3 On the other hand, when the
2One has to exclude the possibility that the evidential marker is used simply as an
epistemic modal.
3But see (Tatevosov, 2007, p. 374–379) for an enlightening discussion. Tatevosov argues
that 1.) inference from results (in Bagvalal) is not limited to lexically encoded process-result
regularities; and 2.) amount of background knowledge the speaker possesses can influence
whether he can draw the inference that underlies the use of the evidential.
Also see §5.3.3 for the discussion of Koev (2010), where a convincing argument is made
that the main meaning contribution of the Bulgarian direct evidential (Indicative) does not
concern “direct perceptual experience”, but rather the time when the speaker learned about
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inference in question is performed on the basis of hearsay information, its
premises are explicitly provided to us in the form of the original utterance(s), so
we can ask the same question regarding the contrast between hearsay evidential
markers and other means of conveying information — inference evidentials or
epistemic modals.
So our question becomes: how far can one diverge from the words of
a report while still attaching the hearsay marker to the information derived
from that report?
5.2 Bulgarian data
Before taking on the topic of Bulgarian evidentiality, I would like to
make a short introduction into the system of Bulgarian verb forms. My prin-
cipal sources were Andrejčin (1944),4 Scatton (1984). A comprehensive de-
scription of the Bulgarian evidential system can be found in Nitzolova (2007)
(in Russian). Kutzarov (1994) has an excellent historical overview. Native
speaker judgments in this chapter were provided by Ivan Derzhanski, Bojan
Popov, Andrejka Lechev, Boris Doynov and Iordan Ganev. I would like to
express my sincere gratitude to my Bulgarian consultants.
Bulgarian has a rich system of tenses; its verbal system is more complex
than that of any other Slavic language. There are nine tenses: Present, Aorist,
Imperfect, Perfect, Pluperfect, Future, Future Perfect, Past Future and Past
Future Perfect. Present, Aorist and Imperfect are formed synthetically, each
with its own set of person/number endings. Perfect tenses are formed by
the event in question.
4I used the Russian translation Andrejčin (1949), since it is easier for me to read Russian
than Bulgarian.
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combining an auxiliary săm (‘be’) with a participle; Future tenses are formed
by combining another auxiliary šta (historically derived form a verb meaning
‘want’) with a finite form of the main verb (in some of the future tenses,
together with a particle da). Negative forms of Future tenses employ negative
forms of the verb imam ‘have’. For a full list of indicative forms, see Tables 5.1
and 5.2. Bulgarian also has Imperative and Conditional moods.
5.2.1 Types of evidentials. Morphology
There are three classes of forms in Bulgarian that have been classified as
indirect evidentials: hearsay, inferential, and hearsay with negative attitude5
expressed by the actual speaker. The hearsay evidential is called “preiskazno
naklonenie” in the Bulgarian tradition; Scatton (1984) translates this as Re-
narrated mood. For the inferential6, Demina (1970) has coined the name
Conclusive, and this term is adopted by Nitzolova (2006, 2007). Nitzolova
also uses the term Dubitative for hearsay with negative attitude. Indicative is
used as the name of the forms that mark direct evidence (in the past tenses)
or are neutral with respect to the type of evidence (in the present and future
tenses). This is the terminology that I will employ in this chapter.7
Indirect evidential forms only distinguish five tenses instead of nine in
the Indicative: forms with reference point in the present are not distinguished
from forms with reference point in the past. Thus, evidential verb forms for
Imperfect coincide with those for Present; forms for Pluperfect with Perfect,
5Normally disbelief, but sometimes also expression of inappropriateness.
6As we shall see, this form does not actually always signal inference.
7In example translations, I will use the parenthetical (reportedly) to indicate Renarrated,
and (apparently) or epistemic must for Conclusive. Verbs in Indicative will not be marked.
The reader should keep in mind that these translations are extremely approximate.
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Past Future with Future, and Past Future Perfect with Future Perfect.8 Aorist
forms are not ambiguous (within the evidential subsystem); they are also the
most frequent ones in texts.
Evidential forms in Bulgarian are historically derived from Perfect forms;
all of them contain an l -participle, either of the main verb, or of one of the
auxiliaries.
Renarrated is formed by replacing the head of the corresponding in-
dicative form (verb or auxiliary) with its l -participle and adding the present
tense of the auxiliary săm ‘be’ in the 1st and the 2nd person. There is no
auxiliary in the 3rd person. Conclusive is exactly the same, except the aux-
iliary in the 3rd person is retained. Dubitative is formed by applying the
Renarrated-forming operation to the săm auxiliary of the Conclusive. Thus,
Dubitative looks formally as Renarrated of the Conclusive, and this is the way
it is analyzed, for example, by Kutzarov (1994). The semantics of Dubitative,
however, is most certainly not derived compositionally from the semantics of
Renarrated and Conclusive.
According to most descriptions, Conclusive is only used in past tenses.
Maslov (1981) does provide several examples for Present and Future, but these
examples do not sound natural to my informant. Therefore, these forms are
absent from Tables 5.1 and 5.2, borrowed from Nitzolova (2006), p. 40–41.
8It is not clear whether some of these forms exist in the Conclusive; see below.
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Indicative Conclusive Renarrated Dubitative
Present
1. pǐsa pǐsel săm pǐsel săm bil
2. pǐseš pǐsel si pǐsel si bil
3. pǐse pǐsel pǐsel bil
1. pǐsem pǐseli sme pǐseli sme bili
2. pǐsete pǐseli ste pǐseli ste bili
3. pǐsat pǐseli pǐseli bili
Imperfect Imperfect = Present
1. pǐsex pǐsel săm pǐsel săm pǐsel săm bil
2. pǐseše pǐsel si pǐsel si pǐsel si bil
3. pǐseše pǐsel e pǐsel pǐsel bil
1. pǐsexme pǐseli sme pǐseli sme pǐseli sme bili
2. pǐsexte pǐseli ste pǐseli ste pǐseli ste bili
3. pǐsexa pǐseli sa pǐseli pǐseli bili
Future
1. šte pǐsa štjal săm da pǐsa štjal săm bil da pǐsa
2. šte pǐseš štjal si da pǐseš štjal si bil da pǐseš
3. šte pǐse štjal da pǐse štjal bil da pǐse
1. šte pǐsem šteli sme da pǐsem šteli sme bili da pǐsem
2. šte pǐsete šteli ste da pǐsete šteli ste bili da pǐsete
3. šte pǐsat šteli da pǐsat šteli bili da pǐsat
Past Future Past Future = Future
1. štjax da štjal săm da štjal săm da štjal săm bil da
pǐsa pǐsa pǐsa pǐsa
2. šteše da štjal si da štjal si da štjal si bil da
pǐseš pǐseš pǐseš pǐseš
3. šteše da pǐse štjal e da pǐse štjal da pǐse štjal bil da pǐse
1. štjaxme da šteli sme da šteli sme da šteli sme bili da
pǐsem pǐsem pǐsem pǐsem
2. štjaxte da šteli ste da šteli ste da šteli ste bili da
pǐsete pǐsete pǐsete pǐsete
3. štjaxa da pǐsat šteli sa da pǐsat šteli da pǐsat šteli bili da pǐsat
Perfect
1. pisal săm bil săm pisal bil săm pisal
2. pisal si bil si pisal bil si pisal
3. pisal e bil e pisal bil pisal
1. pisali sme bili sme pisali bili sme pisali
2. pisali ste bili ste pisali bili ste pisali
3. pisali sa bili sa pisali bili pisali
Figure 5.1: Forms of the verb pǐsa ‘to write’, part 1
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Indicative Conclusive Renarrated Dubitative
Pluperfect Pluperfect = Perfect
1. bjax pisal bil săm pisal bil săm pisal
2. beše pisal bil si pisal bil si pisal
3. beše pisal bil e pisal bil pisal
1. bjaxme pisali bili sme pisali bili sme pisali
2. bjaxte pisali bili ste pisali bili ste pisali
3. bjaxa pisali bili sa pisali bili pisali
Future Perfect
1. šte săm pisal štjal săm da štjal săm bil da
săm pisal săm pisal
2. šte si pisal štjal si da štjal si bil da
si pisal si pisal
3. šte e pisal štjal da e pisal štjal bil da e pisal
1. šte sme pisali šteli sme da šteli sme bili da
sme pisali sme pisali
2. šte ste pisali šteli ste da šteli ste bili da
ste pisali ste pisali
3. šte sa pisali šteli da šteli bili da
sa pisali sa pisali
Past Future Perfect Past Future Perfect = Past Perfect
1. štjax da štjal săm da štjal săm da štjal săm bil da
săm pisal săm pisal săm pisal săm pisal
2. šteše da štjal si da štjal si da štjal si bil da
si pisal si pisal si pisal si pisal
3. šteše da e pisal štjal e da e pisal štjal da e pisal štjal bil da e pisal
1. štjaxme da šteli sme da šteli sme da šteli sme bili da
sme pisali sme pisali sme pisali sme pisali
2. štjaxte da šteli ste da šteli ste da šteli ste bili da
ste pisali ste pisali ste pisali ste pisali
3. štjaxa da šteli sa da šteli da šteli bili da
sa pisali sa pisali sa pisali sa pisali
Aorist
1. pisax pisal săm pisal săm pisal săm bil
2. pisa pisal si pisal si pisal si bil
3. pisa pisal e pisal pisal bil
1. pisaxme pisali sme pisali sme pisali sme bili
2. pisaxte pisali ste pisali ste pisali ste bili
3. pisaxa pisali sa pisali pisali bili
Figure 5.2: Forms of the verb pǐsa ‘to write’, part 2
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5.2.2 History of description
Interestingly, hearsay and inferential forms have different status in Bul-
garian traditional grammar9. Hearsay forms have been noted since the second
half of the XIXth century. The first comprehensive grammar that considered
the whole paradigm of these forms is Andrejčin (1944). In that grammar,
they are simply called Renarrated tenses. In more recent grammars, such as
Bojadzhiev et al. (1983) and Scatton (1984), they are listed under the name Re-
narrated mood. Each of these grammars devotes a separate section to hearsay
forms.
Inferential forms, on the other hand, are scarcely mentioned in Scat-
ton (1984). Bojadzhiev et al. (1983) has a half-page footnote (p. 324) in a
section on Perfect, where the inferential uses of Perfect are explained and the
existence of a whole subsystem of forms parallel to Renarrated is briefly men-
tioned. Andrejčin (1944) notes it in separate paragraphs within his discussion
of the renarrated forms that retaining the auxiliary signals ‘that actions not
immediately witnessed by us are related as our personal statement’ – in his
discussion of Aorist (§292), Imperfect (§295), Pluperfect (§300), and Future
Perfect (§306).
5.2.3 Friedman’s objections to the mainstream analysis
While the analysis of the Bulgarian verb that includes both Renar-
rated and Conclusive as separate forms has now become mainstream among
linguists in Bulgaria (and Russia)10, there remains considerable opposition to
9In discussing the history of treatment for evidential forms in the Bulgarian tradition, I
am following Kutzarov (1984, 1994) and Nitzolova (2007).
10Important differences still exist among Bulgarian linguists as to the number of evi-
dential forms (such as whether Conclusive can be used in present and future tenses), the
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it in the Western tradition. Perhaps the most vocal among those opponents
is Victor Friedman, whose numerous works maintain that perfect-based forms
in Bulgarian, as well as in other languages (Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish,
Georgian and more) should not be taken as expressing evidentiality.
His position can be summarized as follows:
1. Forms traditionally treated as evidential in Bulgarian and Macedonian
do not in fact express evidentiality as part of their grammatical meaning
(“These forms are not special evidential forms but rather forms capable
of expressing evidentiality”, Friedman (1986, p. 169)).
2. There is no grammatical distinction between the 3rd person forms with
retained auxiliary and elided auxiliary in spoken dialects. This is entirely
determined by pragmatics.
3. The tradition distinguishing Renarrated and Conclusive is a result of
L. Andrejčin’s immense influence. “. . . one is tempted to suggest that,
like Noam Chomsky in the United States or Nikolaj Marr in the Soviet
Union, Ljubomir Andrejčin was a linguist engaged in a power struggle
for the hegemony of his ideas and analyses, and like those other linguists,
Andrejčin was successful.11” (Friedman, 2002, p. 209)
role of the Dubitative (whether it should be treated as the Conclusive of the Renarrated
(Kutzarov, 1994)), whether both or either of Renarrated and Conclusive should be treated
as grammemes in the Mood category, and other questions.
11Friedman makes an (irrelevant for us now) factual mistake when he says “In Marr’s
case, the victory only lasted as long as Stalin”. Marr’s pseudo-scientific theory, after years
of hegemony in the Soviet Union in the 30-s and 40-s, was in fact denounced by Stalin
himself, in his 1950 article ‘Marxism and the problems of language study’ (Marksizm i
voprosy jazykoznanija).
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4. The fact that in standard language forms with and without the auxiliary
are used in different ways is due to prescriptive pressure. Here Friedman
makes a comparison to the definite article morphemes in standard Bul-
garian, which combine forms from different dialects and introduce case
distinctions which are absent from every particular dialect.
There is a lot of interesting evidence in Friedman’s works, and it de-
serves careful consideration. Here are some counterarguments:
1. Even if the grammar of standardized Bulgarian differs from grammars of
individual dialects, it is still a grammar of a natural language. Similar
situations exist almost everywhere standard languages exist; sometimes
the difference between spoken dialects and a standard language is con-
siderably larger than in the case of Bulgarian (for example, in Arabic or
Chinese). Still, speakers of the standard language have intuitions and
these intuitions are worth investigating. Speakers I worked with demon-
strate considerable agreement as to where Renarrated and Conclusive
are appropriate, even though no standard grammar text specifies where
the distinction lies with enough precision.
Friedman himself notes that many of his problematic examples, even
though they are taken from naturally occurring spoken discourse, are
judged ungrammatical by the majority of the speakers.
2. It is not true that Andrejčin’s analysis is considered infallible by Bulgar-
ian grammarians. Andrejčin (1944) does not have a detailed description
of Conclusive (even though, according to Kutzarov (1994, p. 30), his 1936
doctoral dissertation is closer to modern views of scholars like Kutzarov
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himself, Gerdzhikov or Nitzolova). It is also not true that earlier descrip-
tions by Tzonev (1910) contradict Andrejčin’s judgments, as claimed in
Friedman (2002, p. 216). Considering example
(69) (a) Rekata pridošla.
(b) Rekata e pridošla.
‘The river has risen’
Tzonev identifies (2a) as Renarrated (without using the term) and as-
signs it greater confidence than the Conclusive (2b). Andrejčin (1944,
292) calls Conclusive ‘expression of a past action as a personal statement,
even if we have not witnessed it’. Indeed, Conclusive signals ‘personal’
inference on the part of the speaker, but there is no guarantee that this
personal statement expresses greater confidence than that of a reliable
witness. See discussion of (Fitneva, 2001) below.
3. Some of Friedman’s examples are problematic; some others are explain-























‘I called my uncle. He wasn’t home, apparently he was at the
beach’12
12The original example from (Friedman, 2000, p. 331) is in Macedonian (Mu se javiv
na vujko mi. Ne beše doma, na plaža bil.). The Bulgarian translation exhibits the same
distribution of evidential markers.
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Here, strictly speaking, the speaker obtained all information over the
phone from his aunt. But the information that the uncle was not home
was received from a more immediate (good enough) source, so there are
sufficient grounds to use the Indicative. On the other hand, information
that the uncle was at the beach was only obtained through hearsay; the
speaker’s aunt could not see whether it was true. So using Renarrated
or Conclusive is required (my consultant preferred the Conclusive, given
that the aunt is a reliable source). Of course, directness of informa-
tion source correlates with its reliability, which is the parameter that
Friedman uses to explain this example13.
4. Certain features of Bulgarian forms as described by the mainstream lin-
guists find parallels in descriptions of unrelated languages with eviden-
tials; thus they may represent instances of typologically significant gen-
eralizations (whether universals or tendencies). One would not expect
such regularities if the evidential nature of forms involving l -participle
were just a figment of prescriptive linguists’ imagination.
• Renarrated forms have wider applicability than indirect speech.
• There are narrative genres (specifically, folklore tales) where Renar-
rated is used almost exclusively.
• Significant events that occurred some time ago may be narrated in
Indicative even when the speaker was not a witness to them. See
discussion in Section 5.2.5.
13Martina Faller (p. c.) objects to my attempt to use the notion of the best possible source
(Faller, 2002) here, since in principle the event of the uncle’s absence could be witnessed
personally by someone in the house (e. g., the speaker’s aunt).
This example also poses a problem for Koev’s theory of the meaning of Indicative, dis-
cussed in §5.3.3, see p. 146.
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5. As an explanation for the rules of omitting the third person auxiliary
in the forms with an l -participle, Friedman refers to the works of Grace
Fielder, such as (Fielder, 1995). Fielder maintains that the main param-
eter that influences the choice of the form is whether the information in
the sentence is foregrounded or backgrounded. In some of her examples
this indeed seems to be the best explanation. However Fielder herself
admits that not every case of auxiliary omission or retainment can be
explained in this way. Moreover, she recognizes that there is high cor-
relation of AUX+ — her code for l -participle forms with the auxiliary,
— with, first, inference on the part of the speaker himself as opposed to
mere hearsay (cf. Demina (1959); Kutzarov (1994); Nitzolova (2007) and
many others) — many of her examples involve explicit markers of epis-
temic modality or supposition, and, second, with personal statements of
the speaker (cf. Andrejčin (1944, §§292,295,300,306)). In my experience,
speakers tend to prefer the Conclusive when they consider the source of
hearsay information to be reliable and are ready to take responsibility
for its veracity.
Friedman (1986) interprets forms traditionally labeled as Indicative
mood as expressing confirmation on the part of the speaker; forms with plu-
perfect marking (Dubitative in our terminology) as expressing lack of confir-
mation, and forms with perfect marking (both Renarrated and Conclusive,
according to our terminology) as neutral with respect to speaker confirmation.
He further claims that there is no systematic difference in meaning between
forms where the auxiliary is omitted in the 3rd person (‘Renarrated’) and those
where it is retained (‘Conclusive’).
A compelling case against Friedman’s (and others) analysis is provided
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by Fitneva (2001). The main idea of that article is to test whether Bulgarian
grammatically encodes the source of information (as the mainstream Bulgarian
grammarians maintain) or the speaker’s degree of certainty (Friedman’s theory
clearly falls into this class). Fitneva notes that for different classes of situations
either hearsay evidence or inference from indirect evidence can provide greater
certainty.
. . . In the context of a story, a protagonist A asked the charac-
ters B and C about their friend D. B and C gave different infor-
mation and, crucially, their statements were worded using different
word endings. The children’s task was to say whom they think A
believed.. . .
To distinguish between the evidential and speaker attitude the-
ories, in the stories used in the first study, A asked about D’s where-
abouts; in the stories used in the second study, A asked what D did.
The prediction was that asking about location would strongly bias
children to seek perceptually acquired information; and how the in-
formation was acquired will be more important than whether it was
speaker or someone else who acquired it, i. e., the [−BE] perfect
would be judged more reliable than the [+BE] perfect. This need
not be the case when people ask about actions. Friedman’s theory,
on the other hand, predicts that in both cases the [+BE] and [−BE]
perfect will be judged equally reliable, because the two forms are
equivalent in expressing the non-confirmation of the speaker.
(Fitneva, 2001, p. 411)
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Here is an example text (ibid., p. 412):
The turtle and the hedgehog are the rabbit’s best friends. One








































































‘To whom did the snail believe?’
9-year old children in Fitneva’s experiments showed the predicted be-
haviour (although to a slightly less than statistically significant degree): when
asked about a character’s whereabouts, 75% indicated [−AUX] form as more
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reliable; when asked about actions, 67% preferred the [+AUX] form. In 6-year
old children, the tendency was present as well, although much weaker.
It is important to note that Fitneva’s examples do not demonstrate
any foregrounding-backgrounding contrast, so that Fielder’s theory is unable
to explain the observed distinctions. Neither is it likely that 9-year old children
are under strong pressure of prescriptive norm, as Friedman would have it. One
is therefore justified to conclude:
• speakers of Bulgarian distinguish between constructions with and with-
out the auxiliary (thus, between Renarrated and Conclusive forms);
• depending on the type of situation, either information presented in Con-
clusive or Renarrated is judged as more reliable. This confirms the hy-
pothesis that these constructions mark information source, and not just
degree of confirmation.
5.2.4 Homonymy
The same morphological form often occurs in several cells of a verb
paradigm; in many cases, different evidential forms are not distinguished, in
others, evidential forms coincide with certain non-evidential ones. In each
case, we need to decide whether we deal with homonymy, or whether there is
an invariant meaning that can be attributed to certain forms.
First, as I mentioned already, within each type of evidentials tenses
with the reference point in the past are not distinguished from those with the
reference point in the present. Here, an invariant (temporal and aspectual
relation with respect to the reference point) is easy to provide; on the other
hand, since the existence of Conclusive forms for the present and the future
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is in doubt, and Renarrated forms have different markedness status in the
past and present tenses as well (see Section 5.2.5), it may be advantageous to
consider these tenses separately.
Second, in the first and second person, Renarrated forms are not dis-
tinguished from Conclusive. One can consider these forms instances of a more
general Indirect evidential. The first and second person are highly marked
forms for indirect evidentials: it is uncommon to have indirect evidence about
oneself, or to notify one’s interlocutor about some indirect information con-
cerning him/her. Most uses of indirect evidentials are in the 3rd person. It
is thus not surprising that certain distinctions present in the unmarked forms
are neutralized in the marked forms.
Third, Aorist for Conclusive has the same form as Indicative for Perfect.
In this case, it is hard to find any invariant meaning; some instances can clearly
only be analyzed as Perfect Indicative, some as Aorist Conclusive. However
many instances can be treated both ways, so a grammarian has to adopt
some arbitrary decision on how to classify them (for example, Nitzolova (2007,
p. 135) considers all the problematic examples Conclusive unless the event in
question was clearly witnessed by the speaker). One class of such problematic
cases is indirect speech, where Perfect is the preferred tense used to refer to
past events.
Fourth, Renarrated forms in Aorist and Present coincide with Mira-
tive — a special set of forms used to express information surprising for the
speaker. While having the same construction express indirect evidentiality
and mirative is common enough among languages (Turkish and Albanian are
cases in point; in both languages, the construction is historically derived from
the perfect as well), it is probably impossible to find a meaning component
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that unites the two. Slobin and Aksu-Koc (1986) speak about “unprepared
mind of the speaker” as an invariant in Turkish. However, in Bulgarian, some
uses of Renarrated do not express unprepared mind. Moreover, many uses
of Conclusive, where an inference has just been made, and the proposition
expressed is not yet added to the speaker’s core belief set, would be better
examples of unprepared mind than hearsay cases.
Fifth, the difference between Imperfect/Present evidential forms and
Aorist forms is that a different kind of l -participle is used (for pǐsa ‘write’, the
Imperfect participle is pǐsel, the Aorist participle pisal). This participle is a
relatively recent innovation, and not all dialects of Bulgarian have it. Even in
those dialects that do, the participles coincide for some verbs, including those
of a productive IIIrd conjugation (for example, the verb strelja ‘to shoot’ has
streljal as both Aorist and Imperfect l -participle). Thus, many verbs do not
distinguish Aorist and Present/Imperfect evidential forms (Nitzolova, 2007,
p. 145).
Such high degree of homonymy may appear strange, but it is far from
being exceptional. One can compare this to a list of interpretations for al-
most any case in almost any nominal case system (take Ablative in Latin,
Instrumental in Russian or Genitive in any language). Another example is the
multitude of uses of the -ing suffix in the English morphology: it serves to
denote at least the main verb in Progressive tenses, participles, gerunds, and
deverbal nouns.
5.2.5 Indicative
As noted by Stankov (1969, p. 166), Bulgarian past tenses in Indica-
tive (Aorist and Imperfect) have acquired presupposition of speaker’s direct
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evidence as part of their grammatical meaning. As a result, when speaking
about events where direct evidence is absent, the speaker is forced to use one
of the forms of indirect evidentiality. On the other hand, Bulgarian Indica-
tive Present and Future are neutral with respect to the source of information.
Thus, when the source of the information is hearsay, the speaker has a choice
between Renarrated and Indicative. Present Renarrated then acquires a prag-
matic connotation of disbelief.
What evidence counts as direct depends on the genre of the text and
the proposition being expressed. For everyday events, the speaker needs to be
a direct witness. For medium-scale historical events, the event has to happen
within the speaker’s lifetime, and the speaker needs to be aware of the news












‘Stalin died in 1953’
but his parents can, even though at the time they got the news from hearsay.
Similar change of perspective with time has been described by Slobin and
Aksu-Koc (1986, p. 163) for Turkish. See also the discussion of this example
in §5.3.3.
In history books, major distant historic events can be introduced by
Indicative, if they are well known, but detailed description will proceed in
Renarrated or Conclusive.
In the language of the press, the journalist can use Indicative or Re-
narrated to demonstrate, respectively, smaller or greater distance from the
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proposition he relates. During the Communist rule, information from the
Soviet news agency TASS was reported in Bulgarian newspapers using Indica-
tive, while information form Western news agencies was reported in Renarrated
(Stoichkova and Chausheva, 1995, p. 259).
5.2.6 Renarrated
Renarrated is used to indicate that the information reported by the
speaker is based on hearsay. The speaker does not guarantee the veracity of
this information. In the past tense, Renarrated does not carry any indication
whether the speaker trusts the information; however, in my tests, when they
do trust it, in the present and future tenses, Indicative tends to be used, and
in the past tenses, Conclusive. The use of Renarrated in everyday speech thus
pragmatically implicates some degree of disbelief. This implication is absent
in genres such as history books, where Renarrated is required for distant past
events. Fairy tales are also told using Renarrated.
In the rest of this section I will be concerned with the question: what
exactly is considered hearsay information?
5.2.6.1 Multiple sources
The information contained in a Renarrated clause may come from sev-
eral unrelated past utterances. Consider the following example:
(72) Ivan: Konstantin used to live in Varna, but two years ago he moved
somewhere else.
Peter, on an unrelated occasion: Konstantin used to live somewhere




















‘Two years ago Konstantin (reportedly) moved from Varna to Sofia.’
In Boris’s utterance, Renarrated is used, even though two primary sources are
combined, and neither of these sources possesses all the information provided
in the Renarrated utterance.
The fact that multiple sources are allowed in building a Renarrated
utterance reduces the cognitive load on the speaker — one does not have to
trace the source of every piece of second-hand information that one possesses;
it is sufficient to mark the information as second-hand. In turn, this allows
the use of Renarrated in folk tales and history texts, where multiple sources
are combined on a regular basis.
On the other hand, since everyone can easily remember a pair of past
utterances that contradict each other, the notion of information as used in Re-
narrated cannot be possibly closed under entailment14 — otherwise one could
have used this contradiction to justify an arbitrary statement in Renarrated.
5.2.6.2 Degree of inference
Although Renarrated can be compared to indirect speech, the speaker
who uses Renarrated has more freedom in choosing the representation of the
information. For example, if A said:
(73) John has sold a car to Bill.
14At least classical entailment where contradiction implies anything.
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this arguably does not constitute grounds for the statement:
(74) A said that Bill has a car now.
On the other hand, if A says
(75) Vasil sold a car to Angel yesterday







‘Angel (reportedly) has a car.’
Scalar inference is possible:













‘Boris (reportedly) solved less than five problems.’
The following several examples test how far the reported proposition
can diverge from the text of the report.









‘Potatoes have become two times more expensive.’
















‘[Peter said that] potatoes have (reportedly) become 1 lv.’
(This example is based on (Faller, 2002, p. 271).) Ivan does not have to keep
track of exactly what information comes from Peter; there is even some room
for misunderstanding: perhaps Ivan thought that the old price was 40 st., so
the new one is actually 80 st.
Another example (also based on (Faller, 2002, p. 271)). Penka tells









‘Tomorrow I will go to Sofia.’
in this case, Minka cannot use Renarrated in the following way when discussing





‘Penka (reportedly) will not come.’
(Faller reports the hearsay evidential is possible in Cuzco Quechua in such a
setup.)
A third example (this time based on (Matthewson et al., 2007, p. 16)).







‘I see two bottles.’
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‘Ivan (reportedly) is drunk.’
(Matthewson et al. report that the hearsay evidential is also impossible in
St’át’imcets.)
The distinguishing feature between the cases where Renarrated is al-
lowed and those where it is not seems to be the following: in the examples
where Renarrated is possible, the original speaker has the intention to induce
belief in the proposition that is reported. In (75), C wants his interlocutor to
believe that the car now belongs to Angel. In (78), Peter wants to make Ivan
believe that the new price is 1 lv (or at least, in the case of confusion, Ivan
takes Peter to have that intention). On the other hand, in (80), Penka does
not have the intention to make Minka believe that she will miss the party, even
though she does herself have this belief and acquisition of this belief by Minka
is one of the results of her utterance. In (82) Ivan has no intention to make
anyone believe he is drunk; he just reports what he sees. On the other hand,
if Ivan does in fact know that there is only one bottle, and uses his utterance
as a way to indicate that he is drunk, (83) becomes appropriate.
The report need not be based on a single utterance from a single source.
On the other hand, it cannot rely on the absence of certain utterances in a
large corpus. In other words, derivation operations allowed in producing a Re-
narrated statement do not include inference from ignorance. The statement
in (84) follows from a corpus of hearsay knowledge of Bulgarian history, com-
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bined with the assumption that this corpus covers all the important relevant











‘Hungarians never (apparently/#reportedly) conquered Bulgaria’
5.2.7 Conclusive
In many cases, Conclusive is used in situations where the proposition
stated in the sentence is known by inference. The inference in question can be
of any type:
• From results to the process that led to those results.









‘Ivan drank wine yesterday.’
• From a process to the result of this process.











‘Ivan returned (home) by 10pm.’
• From a general statement to a particular instance.15
15Izvorski (1997) states that this is not possible. Her example:
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‘Ivan was at work on Tuesday at 2pm.’













‘Ivan surely must have drunk all the wine yesterday.’
Here sigurno ‘surely’ indicates that the defeasible inference lacks relia-
bility.
• Inductive inference.
(89) Situation: three eggs in a carton turned out to be rotten. Speaker







‘All the eggs have rotted.’
• Inference to the best explanation.











‘Ivan (apparently) drank all the wine yesterday.’
Note, however, that Izvorski does not use the auxiliary in this example. So, according to
the descriptions I have, this would count as Renarrated.
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(90) Situation: Ivan should have arrived some time ago, but there is





















































‘From there he would immediately start off to C, and traveled



















‘Therefore, he used to reach C from A in 3 hours.’
In this example, I use Imperfect in order to clearly distinguish Conclusive
from Indicative Perfect.





































‘A gun (apparently) cost as much as a cow with a calf: a very
high price, since weapons were (apparently) valued very much at
that time.’ (Taxov, cited by Nitzolova (2007, p. 177))
The last type of inference is especially interesting. The passage comes
from a text where Renarrated would be expected for information taken from
the documents. Nitzolova remarks that the passage presents the historian’s
conclusions based on the document. Since in this case premises strictly imply
the conclusion (at least the clause with the verb cost), there is no room to
construct a possible worlds structure where everything in the document were
true and the statement about costs were false. Therefore, from the fact that
Renarrated was not chosen for this verb, we can conclude that Renarrated in
Bulgarian cannot be analyzed as an epistemic modal, the way Izvorski (1997)
(for Bulgarian) and Matthewson et al. (2007) (for St’át’imcets) do.
However there are uses of Conclusive where no inference is involved.
Nitzolova (2007) states that Conclusive can be used in cases of the so called
“weak knowledge” of the speaker — knowledge that is not based on speaker’s





















‘My mother played violin when she was a child.’ (Nitzolova, 2007,
p. 138)
The difference between Renarrated and Conclusive in such cases is that
in cases of Renarrated it is part of the grammatical meaning that the infor-
mation is based on hearsay, and speaker’s attitude to the information is not
expressed. On the other hand, if Conclusive is used, the grammatical meaning
tells us that the speaker takes responsibility for the veracity of expressed infor-
mation, and the source is not expressed (other than that it’s not perception).
The general meaning of Conclusive seems to be that of indirect evidentiality,
rather than that of an inferential marker.16 Nitzolova provides examples where























‘My grandfather, being a teacher, (must have) played (the part of)
Ivanko, and (reportedly) later became a priest.’
5.2.8 Evidentials in embedded contexts
Evidential markers cross-linguistically have the tendency to only occur
in the main clause of a sentence. This is not the case with Bulgarian.
Both Renarrated and Conclusive are used in indirect speech or as com-
plements of verbs of propositional attitude. In this case, Renarrated meaning
seems to be redundant, since it is already conveyed by the speech/propositional
16Stankov (1969, p. 174) considers these forms neutral with respect to source of informa-
tion, as opposed to past Indicative (direct evidence required) and Renarrated (hearsay).
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attitude verb. The choice between Renarrated, on one hand, and Conclusive
or Indicative (depending on tense), on the other hand, implicates degree of
speaker’s belief in the hearsay information conveyed (see also §5.3.2).
Renarrated and Conclusive can also occur in other types of subordi-









‘If he came out, they would (reportedly) have seen him’ (The speaker
describes the situation on the basis of someone else’s words.)



















‘If they could (apparently) write, there must be texts somewhere.’
Note that in (95), both the antecedent and the consequent of the conditional
are in Renarrated; one can probably say that the antecedent agrees with the
consequent in its evidential marking. In (96), on the other hand, only the
antecedent has Conclusive marking. This example clearly shows that the use of
the evidential is descriptive, not m-performative, according to the terminology
of Faller (2006), and thus does contribute to the propositional content of the
sentence.











‘I saw a man who (reportedly) robbed a bank.’
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The indefinite NP containing this relative clause can have narrow scope with





















‘If I see a man (anyone) who (reportedly) robbed the bank, I will call
the police.’
One distinctive feature typical of evidentials is that they always take







‘Ivan (reportedly) didn’t leave.’
does not have the reading ‘I don’t have hearsay information that Ivan left’.
5.3 Formal theories of evidential meaning
There has been a lot of work in formal semantics in recent years on the
topic of evidentials. While most of the problems that attracted the linguists’
attention are orthogonal to my concerns, a short survey is in order.
5.3.1 Evidentials as not-at-issue meaning
Perhaps the most widely discussed property of evidentials is lack of in-
teraction with the main content of the sentence containing them. In particular,
evidentials are never directly challengeable17:

















‘That’s not true!’ (can only mean ‘He did not drink a lot of wine!’, not
#‘You did not hear that!’)
In most languages, evidentials appear to take wide scope with respect to op-











‘Ivan reportedly didn’t drink a lot of wine.’, not ‘# I didn’t hear that
Ivan drank a lot of wine’
As we can see, the evidential meaning cannot be part of the sentence assertion.
Several theories have been proposed as to what it is:
• evidential meaning as presupposition (Izvorski, 1997; Matthewson et al.,
2007; McCready and Ogata, 2007);
• evidentials as illocutionary operators (Faller, 2002);
• evidentials as not-at-issue assertion (Murray, 2010; Koev, 2010).
5.3.1.1 Evidential meaning as presupposition
Izvorski (1997) proposed a theory that treats evidentials as a kind of
epistemic modal, using Bulgarian for most of her examples. She couches her
analysis in terms of Kratzer’s theory of modality (Kratzer, 1981). The modal
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base is taken to be the set of worlds where indirect evidence is true (premises
of inference for inferential evidentials, existence of the report for hearsay evi-
dentials). The ordering source is normality — worlds are more normal where
the evidence actually points to the expected conclusions and reports are true.
Having established what kind of modality is expressed by evidentials,
Izvorski presents the following analysis for p-R:18
• Assertion: p in view of speaker’s knowledge state
• Presupposition: speaker has indirect evidence for p
One problem with this analysis is that presuppositions typically can
be satisfied at levels other than the outermost discourse scope. For example,
it should be possible to bind the hearsay presupposition in the conditional
antecedent.























‘If there are bottles in Ivan’s office, then he (apparently) drank wine
yesterday.’
But for Renarrated, attempts to cancel the presupposition fail.
18In that article, both hearsay and inferential evidentiality is taken to be expressed by
an l -participle without auxiliary, as opposed to Perfect, expressed by an l -participle with
























‘If Maria says that Angel bought a car, then Angel (reportedly) has a
car.’
McCready and Asher (2006) use the mechanisms of Structured Dis-
course Representation Theory (SDRT) to express the restriction as to where
the presupposition is allowed to be bound. Presupposition generated by ev-
identials, according to their approach, has to be externally anchored, which
guarantees that it is only satisfied at the highest level of discourse.
Still, one feature distinguishes evidential meaning from most presup-
position types. Presupposition is typically expected to be satisfied in the
common ground of the discourse prior to the utterance of a sentence that car-
ries the presupposition. Mechanisms for presupposition accommodation do
exist, but their use is exception rather than the rule. Evidential meaning,
on the contrary, is typically new information in the discourse context. Thus,
if it is presupposition, it is a special kind that is particularly well suited for
accommodation.
The analysis of evidentials as epistemic modals fails in cases where there
are no possible worlds to play with — such as when the reasoning involved
is mathematical. In (91), for example, one cannot use Renarrated for the
conclusion, even though it holds in every world compatible with the premises
(known through hearsay). One would need to use a non-standard theory of
semantics for epistemic modals in order to accommodate this, such as (von
Fintel and Gillies, 2009a) (this approach is discussed in more detail in §6.5).
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5.3.1.2 Evidentials as illocutionary operators
A theory initially proposed by Faller (2002) treats evidentials as speech
act modifiers. An evidential takes a whole speech act as its argument and pro-
duces another speech act, specifying its sincerity conditions and illocutionary
force.
For example, the hearsay evidential marker -si in Cuzco Quechua is
analyzed in the following way:19
−si : assert(p)
sinc = {Bel(s, p)} 7−→
present(p)
sinc = {∃s2 [Assert(s2 , p) ∧ s2 /∈ {h, s}]}
That is, a sentence without evidentiality markers expresses a speech act of
assertion, with sincerity conditions stating that the speaker believes the con-
tents of this assertion. When modified by the -si marker, it transforms into a
speech act where the content of the proposition is just presented, not asserted,
and the sincerity conditions state that there is another speaker, other than the
current speaker and hearer, who asserted this proposition.20
5.3.1.3 Not-at-issue propositions
Still another theory of evidential contribution to meaning is defended
in Murray (2010). This approach is based on dynamic epistemic logic, so the
meaning of each sentence is taken to be an update function on the common
ground of the conversation. In Murray’s theory, the effect of an utterance
containing an evidential consists of two updates: first, a non-negotiable update
19This is one of the variants presented by Faller (p. 200). On p. 203 another, more
complicated analysis is given. Faller does not make a final choice as to which analysis she
prefers.
20For such analysis to be complete, one would need to specify how an evidential morpheme
transforms a speech act other than assertion, such as questions.
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with a proposition that is not at issue and not directly challengeable, and,
second, a proposal for a further update that can be rejected by the hearer.
The language that serves as a testbed for Murray is Cheyenne.
Here is the analysis for a Cheyenne sentence marked with a (zero) direct





‘Floyd won, I’m sure’
λp[ (p = λw[won(w,floyd)]) ∧ CRT(v0 , i, p) ∧ p(v0 ) ≤ p(v1 )]
(at-issue proposition) (ev.restriction) (ill. relation)
Here, the first conjunct introduces a discourse referent for the proposition
under discussion, the second conjunct restricts the common ground to those
possible worlds where the speaker has certain evidence for this proposition,
and the third conjunct establishes an ordering over the remaining worlds in
the common ground such that the worlds where the proposition is true are
ranked higher than those where it is false. It is then up to the hearer to accept
the proposition and thereby erase the suboptimal worlds from the common
ground.
This theory serves as a background for Koev’s work on Bulgarian evi-
dentiality (Koev, 2010).
5.3.1.4 Tests
Faller (2006) suggested a number of tests to distinguish evidentials
amenable to presuppositional analysis (at least, those contributing to the
propositional content of an utterance) from those that work above the propo-
sitional level, as speech act modifiers. She argues that roles played by evi-
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dentials differ across languages (and perhaps sometimes even across evidential
morphemes within one language). The collection of tests was further extended
by (Matthewson et al., 2007). Let us run them against Bulgarian data.
1. (In)felicity if the embedded proposition is known to be false.
Following Faller (2002), Matthewson et al. assume that the modal base
only contains worlds that the speaker considers possible; therefore, no
modal can be true whose prejacent is known to be false. In the case
of Bulgarian, Atanassov (2010) reports that four native speakers out of

























‘Marina said that Todor has red hair, but his hair is (in fact)
black.’
In (105), the sentence marked by evidential is embedded in an indirect
speech clause, so this may not count as a clear enough case. But my



















‘Todor reportedly has red hair, but his hair is (in fact) black.’






















‘Todor allegedly has red hair! Black is the color of Todor’s hair.’













‘Ivan reportedly made a cake, but there was no cake.’
Again, my consultant judges this sentence to be grammatical,
It seems that acceptability of such examples for native speakers depends
on how natural the story sounds, so one has to be careful in devising the
test passages. In general, since at least some sentences are acceptable,
there appears to be no restriction that requires that the prejacent of the
sentence marked by Renarrated be considered possible by the speaker.
In order to reconcile these data with Izvorski’s theory, one only has to
claim that the modal base for Reportative evidential is allowed to be
wider than the current common ground.
2. (In)felicity if embedded proposition is known to be true. Matt-
hewson et al. predict that a modal cannot be used if the proposition
is known to be true. In Bulgarian, this is certainly not the case. For
example, well established facts of history are presented using Renarrated.
3. (In)direct evidence requirements not cancelable. Here, actually,
both theories converge in their predictions. In neither of them the type
of evidence is conversational implicature, so it should not be cancelable.
It is not cancelable in Bulgarian, as one would expect.
4. Indirect evidence requirement not blocked by negation. Again,
both theories predict that the requirement take wide scope over negation,
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and in Bulgarian, it does (see (101)). At the same time, McCready
and Ogata (2007, p. 169–170) report that certain kinds of evidentials
in Japanese can take narrow scope with respect to a certain type of
negation.
5. Challengeability. Faller (2002) argues that epistemic modals can be
directly challenged, and therefore it should be possible to challenge the
content of evidentials if they are a kind of epistemic modals. On the
other hand, what would such challenge amount to? Suppose we ac-
cept Izvorski’s analysis of the Renarrated. In this case, the existence
of hearsay evidence should not be challengeable, since it does not form
a part of the assertion, but a presupposition. Given that the evidence
exists, in normal worlds — those where people speak the truth, — it
is guaranteed that the prejacent will be true, and therefore, the modal
statement will be true as well. There is nothing to challenge.
6. Interrogative flip. Evidentials can be used in speech acts other than
assertion. In questions, one interpretation that is present in all languages
is that the hearer is expected to have information about the answer based
on the source specified by the evidential.21 This phenomenon is called
the interrogative flip. Garrett (2001) uses the term origo to denote the
agent whose point of view is reflected in the evidential morphemes.
The flip seems relatively easy to explain under the illocutionary theory: a
question is a request for an answer, which is another speech act. It is this
requested act whose specification is modified by the evidential. Under the
21In some languages other interpretations are available, see (Faller, 2002, p. 230) for
Quechua and (Murray, 2010, p. 113) for Cheyenne.
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modal theory it seems harder to explain how one operator (the question)
influences the other (the modal) by modifying its modal base. Since
evidentials are a kind of indexicals (see the next subsection for that),
the question operator appears to be a monster-inducing environment
(Anand and Nevins, 2004), where this particular context index is shifted,
while all the others stay in place. In any case, the flip is present both in
languages where the illocutionary theory provides better analysis of the
data and in those where evidentials seem to be a kind of modals.
In Bulgarian, the flip is present in questions. Example from Nitzolova
(2007, p. 119):









‘And what happened next?’
Renarrated is also possible in imperatives. In this case, the imperative
does not play the role of performative, but is presented as originating
from someone else. Again from Nitzolova (2007, p. 118)













‘He listens to her words. . . He is to spud the vine! (Stratiev)
7. Embeddability. In the illocutionary modifier theory evidentials should
never be embeddable, since they operate on a different level than the
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propositional content of the sentence. Similarly, they should not be
embeddable on Murray’s not-at-issue assertion theory, because there we
first apply the not-at-issue content and only then start to work on the
at-issue assertion, so there is no way to mix the two operations. In the
epistemic modal theory, there is no reason for the content of evidentials
not to interact with other propositional content. In Bulgarian we do
find such an interaction, as proved by (95)–(97). (97), repeated here
for convenience, is particularly interesting, since there is no way to even
state what the proposition is in the scope of the evidential: it contains











‘I saw a man who (reportedly) robbed a bank.’
5.3.2 Speaker orientation
Since evidentials signal the source of evidence that supports the belief
in the content of the sentence in their scope, a question arises who the subject
of that belief is. In an independent sentence this subject is naturally taken to
be the current speaker, but for evidentials embedded in complements of speech
or belief verbs, they might have referred to the beliefs of the subject of these
verbs.
This is the question investigated by Sauerland and Schenner (2007).
They conclude that in Bulgarian indirect speech complements evidentials be-
















‘Maria said that Todor has red hair.’
(111) is appropriate when the speaker has not seen Todor’s hair, and it’s
his belief that it is red that is based on hearsay; Maria’s belief is based on
perceptual evidence. On the other hand, if the speaker has perceptual evidence















‘Maria said that Todor has red hair.’
In contrast, Garrett (2001) states that in Tibetan, embedded reporta-
tives express the source of information from the point of view of the subject
of the verb of speech. Hara (2006) reports that interpretation from the point
of view other than the speaker of the independent sentence is possible for the
Japanese evidential darou, not just for speech and propositional attitude verbs,
but for clauses introduced by because as well.
5.3.3 Temporal theory of evidential meaning
In his work, Koev (2010) considers the opposition of Indicative and
Renarrated in Bulgarian. His work is best interpreted as clarifying the meaning
of Indicative.
Koev’s theory makes use of the following notions: event time, reference
time and learning time. Event time is the time fragment when the event
described in the prejacent happened. Reference time is the time frame which
the sentence is about. Learning time is the time when the speaker (or origo, to
take care of the cases of the interrogative flip) learned about the event under
the appropriate conceptualization.
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The main idea of Koev’s theory is that Indicative signals that the learn-
ing time overlaps with the reference time.
Here are some examples he uses to support his point of view. First,
suppose that on Saturday afternoon the speaker learned that Jack went to New
York Saturday morning from one of their mutual friends. According to Koev,










‘Jack (reportedly) went to New York’
However when asked what Jack did on Saturday (and thus in a context where










‘Jack went to New York’
On the other hand, suppose the speaker witnessed Nixon erase the Watergate
tapes, but only learned what that amounted to some time later (say, from
























‘He was covering up (reportedly) the clues.’
Koev’s theory receives some support from my data. In particular, when
the speaker learns about an event at the time it happens, even if only by
hearsay, Indicative appears to be appropriate:
(116) The speaker sits in a room reading. In the next room there is a TV
set showing a soccer match. The speaker hears, without looking at the








‘Messi scored a goal.’
Another phenomenon that is explained by Koev’s theory is the gradual increase
in acceptability of Indicative as the event in question recedes further in time.
When we talk about events in the distant past, the period that constitutes
reference time tends to become longer: we are talking not about the events of
March 5, 1953, but events of 1953 as a whole. But of course, the speaker needs
to be alive at the time of the event. This explains the peculiar intuitions we











‘Stalin died in 1953’ (can only be used by someone who was born before
1953)
(This sentence can be uttered by someone who was alive in 1953, but not
necessarily an eyewitness of Stalin’s death.)
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At the same time, some details of the distribution between Indicative
and other evidentiality markers (Renarrated and Conclusive) remain problem-
atic for Koev.
First, Present Renarrated has to be taken care of. Since in the Present
tense the event time E overlaps with the speech time S, and the reference time
R overlaps with the event time, the only way we can claim that the learning
lies in between R and S is to stipulate that R lies entirely in the past — that
is, to claim that Present Renarrated is really past, where the event in question
spans a longer period than R.22
Second, one needs to explain examples where different evidential mark-
ers are used for events that happen simultaneously, to mark contrast in cog-























‘I called my uncle. He wasn’t home, apparently he was at the beach’
Koev’s theory would predict Indicative marking for both events of the uncle’s
absence at home and his being at the beach.
Finally, a special provision has to be made for presentation of major
events in history books, where Indicative is used.
22Friedman (2000, p. 340) makes just such a claim on independent grounds.
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5.4 Formal presentation
I can see two ways of adapting my basic semantic framework to cover
the data presented by the Bulgarian evidentials. (In the discussion that follows,
I concentrate primarily on the Renarrated.) One is to assume that the belief
box of a speaker who uses an evidential p-R contains an (internal language)
sentence A said ‘q’, for some primary speaker A and some q such that p is
derivable from q using an inference from a given limited class. The other way
is to have multiple compartments (similar to the belief box) corresponding to
different ways of acquiring information. Thus the speaker of p-R would simply
have q in his compartment used for hearsay information, such that, again, p
is derivable from q using an inference from some limited class.
As an example, according to the first theory, when Boris says Ivan imal
kola ‘Ivan (reportedly) had a car’, this means that he has something like the
sentence Peter said ‘Ivan bought a car yesterday’ in his belief box. According
to the second theory, in such a situation Boris has the sentence Ivan bought a
car yesterday in his hearsay box.
The main advantage of the first theory is that it requires no new ma-
chinery. Any credible account of Mentalese will require that it have enough
power to represent citations, so any such account will allow a speaker to possess
the thoughts that our theory makes him have. The only other requirement is
that the agent should be able to perform certain inferences on the complements
of these internal citations.
But this theory has trouble explaining markers of direct evidence. The
use of Renarrated (especially in the past tenses) does not prevent the secondary
speaker from believing the content of his utterance. In our example, Boris may
sincerely believe Ivan had a car and have a representation of this sentence in
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his belief box. But having this representation will not allow him to say Ivan
imaše kola ‘Ivan had a car’, unless he has some perceptual information. So
these forms, most frequent in actual speech, would have to represent internal
sentences like ‘I have direct evidence that p’ instead of just p. In the case of
major past events, as in (71), there should be a way to obtain ‘I have direct
enough evidence that p’ from ‘I have hearsay evidence that p’ given that p is
a far enough event23.
On the other hand, the theory of a compartmentalized sentence store
has something to recommend it. First, we need some compartments anyway,
to distinguish beliefs from desires and intentions. So why not add another box
for hearsay? A picture arises where sentences are stored in multiple “boxes”.
Some of those boxes are inside one another (information acquired through the
visual channel is a subset of information based on direct evidence; results of
logical inference are a subset of beliefs). Every rule of inference should specify
which box(es) its premises should come from and which box gets to contain
the conclusion.
One problem is that either the number and nature of those compart-
ments will be language specific, or we will need to have as many compartments
as there are types of evidentials in the world’s languages — which is a lot.
I will now present a formalized analysis of Bulgarian evidential markers
using the first theory, i. e., explicit coding of evidential meaning in the internal
language.
I use the presupposition theory of evidential contribution. In order to
avoid stipulating overwhelming evidence for p as a presupposition in a speech
23That is, unless we adopt Koev’s theory and claim that Renarrated and Indicative radi-
cally differ in the kind of conditions they impose on the speaker’s evidence.
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act that asserts p, I take the presupposition to be ‘the speaker has evidence of
the right type concerning the proposition p’ — that is, either for p itself or its
negation24.
First, Past Indicative, that is, forms that signal direct evidence.
Jp-IK =
Presupposition DirectEvidence i(p) ∨ DirectEvidence i(¬p)
Assertion p
where DirectEvidenceA(p) means that agent A has direct evidence that p holds,
and i is the speaker. The DirectEvidence operator applies to formulas in the
internal language (not propositions) and is most likely closed under the same
inferential operations as belief ascriptions.
For Renarrated, I put the claim that there is some previous utterance
(from some speaker A), from which p has to be derivable, into the presup-
position part, in order to make this claim immune to challenges, while still
allowing it to contribute to the propositional content of the utterance. Among
the proposals for dealing with the scope of evidentials, I am not sure the pre-
suppositional one is the most preferable, but I chose it as the most familiar
one. I indicate that the natural logic derivations N is the class of inferences
allowed in deriving p. This class seems to be more or less the same as for
deriving beliefs (see §4.7). However of the other operations used in deriving
beliefs, internal perception cannot be based on another person’s words, so it’s
inapplicable. Example (84) also shows that one cannot base the inference
on the absence of certain information in a corpus of texts, so inference from
ignorance is out of the question as well.
24von Fintel and Gillies (2009a) use a similar presupposition for the epistemic must ; for
them must p presupposes that neither p nor ¬p is directly known.
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At the same time, it is not a particular class of beliefs but the inten-
tions of the original speaker that seems to count (see (83)), so this formal
representation is still not completely adequate. The absence of direct evidence
is implicated by the use of Renarrated, but not presupposed or asserted; the
implication is cancelable, as witnessed by (106), the example where the speaker
knows that hearsay information is false.
Nothing is asserted in a Renarrated utterance, but the hearer’s atten-
tion is being drawn to the proposition p, so that the hearer can accept it or
deny. I use a special kind of speech act here, Presentation, proposed by Faller
(2002).
Jp-RK =
Presupposition ∃A.∃q.(say(A, q) ∧ ((Biq → 〈N〉Bip) ∨(Biq → 〈N〉Bi¬p)))
Presentation p
Finally, for Conclusive I adopt the viewpoint of Stankov (1969): even
though in most cases it signals inference as the source of belief, formally it
serves as the least marked member of the opposition. p-C carries no presup-
position and just asserts p. Conclusive is the only option for the cases where
neither Indicative nor Renarrated are applicable. Most of such uses are those
where there is some inference involved, thus the impression that Conclusive
itself carries the inferential meaning.
It should be emphasized that the treatment I propose for hearsay evi-
dentials is not an alternative to either the presuppositional theory of evidential
contribution to meaning, to illocutionary operator theory or to the theory of
not-at-issue assertion. In fact, my approach is compatible with any of these.
I don’t wish to take sides in the debate on how the evidential contribution fits
into the meaning of the sentence as a whole; I’d like to specify as precisely as
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possible what that contribution consists in. My theory should be contrasted
with the possible world account of propositions which serves as a basis both
to (Izvorski, 1997) (in the form of Kratzer’s theory of epistemic modals) and
to the dynamic semantics of (Murray, 2010).25 Any variant of possible-world
based semantics will have problems with examples like (81) (going to Sofia) or
(83) (seeing two bottles), where the required configuration of possible worlds
is present, but the form of expression in the prejacent is too far from the orig-
inal statement. Another advantage of my account is its ability to explain the
choice of the inferential marker in examples like (92), where a mathematical
calculation is involved. Also, as already mentioned in §5.2.6.1, since there
is no requirement that hearsay information come from a single source, un-
der the possible-world analysis anyone who has ever heard two contradicting
statements should be justified to use Renarrated in stating any proposition at
all.
On the other hand, my theory encounters problems with examples
like Koev’s (115) (Nixon’s tapes), where the hearsay information (that Nixon
had been involved in the destruction of the tapes) serves as a premise in the
speaker’s derivation of the prejacent, but the source of the hearsay information
had no intention to inform the speaker about a particular event.
25In (Faller, 2002), the sincerity conditions of a hearsay evidential include the claim that
p has been asserted. There is no analysis as to what it takes to assert p by uttering q, where
p and q do not coincide.
Faller (2011) tries to clarify the meanings of evidentials using Kratzer’s theory of modals,
claiming that hearsay evidentials select their modal base and inferential markers make use
of the ordering source.
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5.5 Final remarks
Inferential evidentials in some languages are not used to indicate an
arbitrary logical derivation; the inference class is restricted. One example is
the Bagvalal indirect evidential (Tatevosov, 2007) or Cuzco Quechua =chu-
sina (Faller, 2011) which can only signal the inference from the result of a
process to the process itself.
Another is the Japanese darou, which can only be used for inferences
from general regularities to a particular case (Hara, 2006). The mechanisms
developed in this thesis, which allow us to specify classes of inferences, can
be particularly useful in characterizing the meaning of such evidentials. So, if
we use G as the name of the “generic inference” rule, we could analyze the
Japanese p darou as
〈Infer; G; Infer〉Bp
That is, the derivation of p should include at least one use of the G rule.26
The alternative analysis for such limited inferentials is the modal one,
using an appropriate modal base and ordering source. One class of examples
that can distinguish between these two analyses is where the inference is non-
defeasible — where there are no possible worlds that make the premises true
and the conclusion false. In such cases evidentials should be allowed if they
signal the type of inference, but superfluous if they are a kind of modals.
26It should not be possible to derive p without the use of G. This may be considered a
pragmatic restriction, or one could specify it explicitly:
Jp darouK = 〈Infer;G; Infer〉Bp ∧ ¬〈Infer\G〉Bp
where Infer\G is the closure of the rules other than G.
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Unfortunately, both inference from results and generic inference seem to be
inherently defeasible rules, so finding such examples will be difficult.
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Chapter 6
The Paradox of Clarity
6.1 The Problem, Barker and Taranto’s solution
In Barker and Taranto (2003), Taranto (2006), Barker (2009), the con-
struction It is clear that p is analyzed (as well as its variant Clearly, p).
As an initial approximation, the construction seems to mean that p
is entailed by the evidence available to some relevant group, which typically
includes all the participants of the conversation. So, for example,
(117) It is clear that Abby is a doctor.
can be uttered when both the speaker and the hearer are looking at a picture
of a woman wearing a lab coat and a stethoscope.
Barker and Taranto state the following problem: if the evidence pre-
sented to every participant of the conversation (part of the common ground)
already entails p, there is no need in stating p. The common ground, viewed
as a set of possible worlds, does not change after the assertion of clarity is
made.1
The solution proposed by Barker and Taranto involves the notion of
a “linguistic side effect”. Every sentence is assigned some truth conditions,
1As (Barker, 2009) notes, there are cases where the set of relevant participants does not
contain both the speaker and the audience. In these circumstances the paradox does not
arise. One type of such cases are assertions of personal clarity.
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and the dynamic effect of uttering it partly consists in narrowing the com-
mon ground by excluding those possible worlds that do not meet the truth
conditions (this is the “main effect” of uttering the sentence). However, some
changes to the common ground may not be related to the outside world, but
to the state of the communication itself.2 New discourse referents may be
introduced. Standards may be set for vague predicates. For example,
(118) Bill is tall.
may be uttered to provide information about Bill’s height (that is, for its main
effect; this would be a descriptive use of tall), but it could also be uttered in
order to specify what counts as tallness in the situation under discussion (a
metalinguistic use of tall).
Clarity assertions, according to Barker and Taranto, are always used
exclusively for their side effects. Namely, they set standards for what evidence
is considered sufficient for belief in their argument proposition p (Barker and
Taranto, 2003; Taranto, 2006), or what evidence is considered appropriate
justification for p (Barker, 2009). That is, among the context elements consti-
tuting the common ground before the utterance, those are excluded where the
standards of belief/justification in the current conversation are set too high.
The theory proposed by Barker and Taranto has it as its consequence
that asserting the clarity of p does not in fact entail p.
2Barker and Taranto (2003), following Stalnaker, note that the conversation itself is part
of the world. For this reason, they do not consider it necessary to add additional information
to the common ground apart from the set of possible worlds.
Barker (2009) treats the common ground as a set of pairs 〈d,w〉, where d is a state of the
conversation (including standards for vague predicates), and w is a possible world. This is
the formalism I use in discussing B&T’s theory. The difference plays no role in what follows,
however.
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6.2 Problems with B&T
6.2.1 Factivity
There are, however, some problems with this theory. First, the predic-
tion that Clearly, p does not entail p is not borne out. This can be easily seen
by considering cases where p turns out to be false.
Considering cases where clarity assertions stand in the present tense,
B&T can predict the infelicity of statements like
(119) #It is clear that Abby is a doctor, but in fact she is not.
The clarity assertion in the first clause ensures that the speaker believes Abby
to be a doctor. But in this case she cannot sincerely utter the second clause,
on pain of falling victim to Moore’s paradox.
However, as soon as we put the example in the past tense, those prag-
matic factors are no longer in play. Clear examples (120) pattern with simple
statements of a proposition (121), not with expressions of belief (122) or jus-
tifiability assertions (123):
(120) a. #It was clear that Abby was a doctor, but in fact she was not.
b. It seemed clear that Abby was a doctor, but in fact she was not.
(121) a. #Abby was a doctor, but in fact she was not.
b. Abby seemed to be a doctor, but in fact she was not.
(122) a. We believed Abby to be a doctor, but in fact she was not.
b. It seemed to us that we believed Abby to be a doctor, but in fact
she was not.
156
(123) a. It was justifiable to conclude that Abby is a doctor, but in fact she
was not.
b. It seemed justifiable to conclude that Abby is a doctor, but in fact
she was not.
In examples (120a) and (121a) we have a contradiction, which is absent
in (122a) and (123a). In (120b) and (121b), the second clause denies correct-
ness of the speaker’s opinion expressed in the first clause. In (122b) and (123b)
it does not.
Barker claims that Clearly, p patterns with belief assertions (non-
factive) rather than knowledge assertions (factive), since they can be combined
with might not p claims without contradiction. My intuitions differ from his
on this point. Substituting an actual sentence for p in his examples to ease
judgment, we get
(124) a. We know that Abby is a doctor, although she might not be.
b. We believe that Abby is a doctor, although she might not be.
c. It is clear that Abby is a doctor, although she might not be.
It seems to me that the only way to avoid inconsistency in (124c) is by making
a pause after the first clause:
(125) It is clear that Abby is a doctor. . . wait a minute, she might not be
one, she might be an actress.
One can repair hasty knowledge claims in a similar way. So clarity assertions
pattern with factive statements after all.
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6.2.2 Repeated clarity assertions
Secondly, in the Stalnakerian framework, once the standards of justi-
fication/belief are set, they can only get looser in the subsequent discourse
(the context elements with tighter standards have already been eliminated).
Consider, however, the following example.
(126) A and B are sitting in an emergency room. A woman in a lab coat (X)
walks along the corridor.
A: This is clearly a doctor.
A man (Y) walks by in the opposite direction. He wears a lab coat as
well. He also has a stethoscope around his neck and carries a medical
record under his arm.
A: Clearly, this is another doctor.
Suppose we have four possible worlds:
w1 X and Y are both doctors.
w2 X is a doctor. Y is not.
w3 Y is a doctor. X is not.
w4 Neither is a doctor.
We also have three possible degrees of skepticism (these are part of the state
of conversation; we are not interested in the other parts):
d1 Wearing a lab coat is sufficient to be judged a doctor.
d2 Wearing a lab coat is not sufficient, but together with a
stethoscope and a medical record it does satisfy our doubts.
d3 Nothing, even the medical record, is convincing enough.
Note that, since Y has more doctor-like features, there is no refinement of the
vague standard for justification that would make X count as a doctor, but not
Y.
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〈d1 , w1 〉, 〈d1 , w2 〉, 〈d1 , w3 〉, 〈d1 , w4 〉,
〈d2 , w1 〉, 〈d2 , w2 〉, 〈d2 , w3 〉, 〈d2 , w4 〉
〈d3 , w1 〉, 〈d3 , w2 〉, 〈d3 , w3 〉, 〈d3 , w4 〉

After the first utterance, those world-standard pairs are eliminated that don’t
allow lab coat to count as enough evidence for doctorhood (note that the
clarity assertion does not tell us anything about the world itself):
S2 = {〈d1 , w1 〉, 〈d1 , w2 〉, 〈d1 , w3 〉, 〈d1 , w4 〉, }
The second clarity assertion could serve to eliminate d3 out of the set of
possible standards, but these world-standard pairs are already eliminated by
the time it is uttered. Thus, in Barker and Taranto’s framework, the assertion
would be uninformative and therefore infelicitous. However it is perfectly
normal.
6.2.3 No vagueness
Contrary to Barker and Taranto’s claim, clarity assertions can be used
in situations where there is no vagueness at all and the standards for be-
lief/justification are completely determined. In particular, mathematical dis-
course:
(127) Take an integer n divisible by 9. Clearly, n is also divisible by 3.
To accommodate these cases, B&T would have to argue either that
there are vague standards of belief/justification involved (in particular, that
there are context elements where n is divisible by 9, but somehow not by 3),
or that this kind of use is special and needs separate treatment. If they choose
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the latter option, an explanation would be in order, first, why the theory for
mathematical (and similar) uses of clear does not apply to the more mundane
situations, and second, why the polysemy of the Clearly, p construction is the
same across a wide variety of languages.
6.3 Missing inference
My proposal is to take seriously the idea that the clearly construction
marks the result of an inference. Namely,
(128) It is clear to A from q that p can be analyzed as: A has performed a
sound inference which has q as premises and p as conclusion.
This is exactly what Barker (2009) calls the missing entailment theory (and
rejects). On my analysis, It is clear that p does entail p. By asserting clarity,
the speaker takes full responsibility for the soundness of her inference — even
if the inference is defeasible. Thus, the behaviour of (120) is explained. In
(126), the second utterance requires a separate (although similar) inference,
so it is not superfluous.
Availability of clarity assertions for mathematical statements follows
trivially on my account: these statements lose their special status; just like
statements about the world, they are subject to inference operations.
If the from q part of the clarity assertion is omitted, then the evidence
used as source for inference is left unspecified. In fact, when A is not the
speaker, this inference may not be available to the speaker:
(129) I see that it is clear to you that John is lying; can you explain why?
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If the to A part is left out, there should be an inference available to
every participant of the conversation. Moreover, every participant should be
able to make the same inference. This can be illustrated by the following
example. Suppose John has read Crime and Punishment, Mary has read The
Brothers Karamazov, and Peter The Idiot. When they gather to exchange
their opinions, according to my intuition, it would not be appropriate for one
of them to say:
(130) It is clear that Dostoevsky is a great novelist.
even though it is appropriate to utter
(131) It is clear to everyone here that Dostoevsky is a great novelist.
This kind of truth conditions requires that the speaker, in order to assert
clarity of p, both be able to draw the inference herself and be able to attribute
the same inference to the other participants. In order to attribute the inference
to the other participants, she needs to know that they possess the premises
q of the inference. This, of course, still comes short of the definition of the
common ground (for example, the other participants may not know that the
speaker knows that they know q), but it becomes rather hard to construct the
tests, and when they are constructed, it is hard to elicit definite judgments on
the appropriateness of using Clearly, p in such situations. So, for all practical
purposes, my account predicts that the premises of the inference should be
in the common ground when making clarity assertions without specifying the
experiencer.
One way to capture the intuition that in a clarity assertion the speaker
needs to have a specific inference in mind is to construct information states
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not just for individual agents, but for groups as well. There is a discussion in
von Fintel and Gillies (2009b) of ways to aggregate information states. For
their purposes, however, an aggregated state is one where all the information
possessed by a group is pooled (that would correspond to an intersection of
possible world sets or to set union of information states as sets of sentences).
In order to obtain the common ground, one would need to take into account
only the information every participant in the conversation has (thus, set union
of possible world sets or set intersection of representations).
The requirement for the inference justifying the clarity assertions to
be sound can be demonstrated by Gettier cases: suppose Abby is in fact a
doctor, but she is dressed in a lab coat for a Halloween party, with a toy
stethoscope around her neck. Under this scenario, the inference “lab coat
means doctorhood” is not sound, and (117) is false.
Barker and Taranto’s question ‘why ever assert clarity?’ receives a
plausible explanation under this analysis: the speaker notifies the audience
that the information they have (q) is sufficient to infer p. Each member of the
audience is invited to build the inference for himself. The clarity statement
can be used to build a greater confidence in the audience than simply stating
p: upon deriving p, the hearer does not depend any longer on whether he
trusts the speaker.
There are certain features noted by Barker and Taranto that any ac-
count of the clearly construction should be able to explain. Three of these
features fall out immediately from my analysis. These are the inapplicability
of clarity assertions to cases of direct evidence, information already explicitly
stated in the conversation, and belief without proper justification (examples
from Barker (2009)):
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(132) #It is clear that Abby is wearing a stethoscope.
(133) A. Guess what? It turns out that Abby is a doctor!
B. #Now that you’ve told me this, it’s clear that Abby is a doctor.
(134) #It is clear that God exists.
In all of these cases, there is no inference that allows us to assert p; therefore,
the clearly construction is inappropriate.
6.4 Barker’s objections
Reasons given in Barker (2009) for rejecting the “missing entailment”
theory of the kind I am defending are the following. First, clarity assertions
are often made when the proposition in question is not in fact entailed by the
evidence:
(135) It is clear that Abby is a doctor
is said when she might in fact be an actress or dressed for a Halloween party.
All we need to say is that the inference whose existence is stated by the clarity
assertion may be defeasible: it can involve generic statements as premises or
use other types of default rules. There will be no strict entailment in such
cases.
Second, for some examples the missing entailment theory seems to pre-
dict wrong results:
(136) A. John is a bachelor.
B. #Clearly, then, he is not married.
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(137) A. John ate a sandwich and drank a glass of beer.
B. #So it is clear that John ate a sandwich.
We can note that the inferences involved in these examples are ex-
tremely simple: subtyping in (136) and conjunction simplification in (137). So
the missing entailment theory can be saved if we specify that the entailment
in question should be substantial enough — not limited to certain easy types
of inference.
The requirement that the inference be nontrivial may stem from the
fact that people are reluctant to recognize certain simple inference steps as
such.3 After all,
(138) John ate a sandwich and drank a glass of beer. ?Therefore, he ate a
sandwich.
does not sound all that natural either. If we do recognize absence of trivial
inference as part of the meaning of clearly, it has to be a presupposition, as
demonstrated by a negation test:
(139) A. John is a bachelor.
B. #It isn’t clear that he is not married.
(only allowable if B is disputing A’s claim).
The class of ‘trivial’ inferences may, for all I see, coincide with the class
of inferences involved in ascribing beliefs to other persons:
(140) a. Bill believes that John is a bachelor. Therefore, he believes that
John is unmarried.
3This explanation was suggested by Gennaro Chierchia (p. c.).
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b. Bill believes that n is divisible by 9. #Therefore, he believes that
n is divisible by 3.
In (140a), we have a valid inference. It is impossible for a competent speaker
to believe someone to be a bachelor without believing him to be unmarried.
The inference in (140b), on the other hand, is invalid, since humans are not
logically omniscient.
Gradability, which Barker uses as another argument against the missing
entailment theory, is discussed later, in §6.7.
6.5 Clearly vs. epistemic must
In von Fintel and Gillies (2009a), an argument similar to mine is made
with respect to the epistemic must, and a similar solution is proposed:
Epistemic modals signal that their prejacent is not directly settled
by the salient kernel (where ‘kernel’ is a set of propositions — a
structure that does not have the closure property — G. B).
However, clearly and must are not interchangeable.
• In the clearly construction, the existence of an appropriate inference is
part of the assertion. Unlike must, clearly can take narrow scope with
respect to operators like negation and tense.
(141) It is not clear to me that Abby is a doctor, but she might be.
(142) It was clear to me yesterday already that Abby is a doctor.
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(This is a property that many epistemic modals have, but by no means
all of them. For example, the English have to can be embedded under
tense and negation operators.)
• Must does not have to be based on public evidence, even when the
relevant group is not specified explicitly. In fact, there is no way to
specify the relevant group in must.
• In certain situations, an inference can be marked by must, but not by
clearly :
(143) John left two hours ago. Every participant in the conversation
knows this.
a. John must be home by now.
b. ?Clearly, John is home by now.
Note, however, that once the premises of the inference are stated explic-
itly, clarity assertion becomes better:
(144) John left two hours ago. It takes only half an hour to get home
from here. Clearly, he is home by now.
I can see two ways to explain this behaviour:
1. Clarity assertions require the premises of the inference to be actively
entertained by the participants of the conversation. In (143), the
information required to deduce that John must have arrived by
now sits in the background of the interlocutors’ minds. Once it is
foregrounded in (144), one can use the Clearly, p construction.
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The assumption that inferences based solely on background infor-
mation do not give rise to clarity seems to be refuted, though, by
the following example:
(145) The economy is clearly in recession.
can be uttered “out of the blue”, without any preparatory fore-
grounding statements.
2. In (143), the “derivation” that leads to the conclusion involves op-
erations that do not look very much like traditional inference steps:
something like constructing mental scales and measuring distances
on those scales. Presumably, such activity does not count as “easy”
for the purposes of clarity assertion. On the other hand, in (144),
the premises are stated linguistically, and the inference consists in
a couple of standard rule applications.
• One can use clearly to signal an inference whose conclusion is already
known to the speaker.
(146) Mary has been out of town for three days. She has not phoned.
Clearly, I’m worried/#I must be worried.
What matters in this example is that an inference exists from public ev-
idence that leads to the conclusion stated in the prejacent. Even though
the speaker has more direct means of knowing the prejacent, the use of
clearly is sanctioned.
As for the solution proposed by von Fintel and Gillies, it involves (as
has been noted already) contexts as sets of propositions. Such a set induces
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a partition on possible worlds. Proposition p is not settled by the context if
there are possible worlds belonging to the same class in the partition which
don’t agree on p. Such a construction does not distinguish between equiva-
lent propositions, so it is easy to build counterexamples to the theory using
standard philosophical test cases:
(147) a. This animal has a heart.
b. So, clearly, it has a kidney as well/So it must have a kidney as
well.
(148) a. Triangle ABC is equilateral.
b. Clearly, it is equiangular/So it must be equiangular.
Assuming that creatures with a heart are necessarily all and only creatures
with a kidney, proposition this animal has a heart is exactly the same as
proposition this animal has a kidney. Upon uttering (147a), this proposition
is settled in the context of the conversation. (147b) (in either of its variants)
should be abnormal. In fact, it is fine.
6.6 Special case: Sherlock Holmes
There is one special use case of clarity assertions, which can be demon-
strated by an example, suggested by Derek Ball (p. c.). Imagine Sherlock
Holmes investigating a case together with Dr. Watson and Inspector Lestrade.
After all the evidence has been collected (and known by all participants in the
conversation), Holmes points out the murderer:
(149) It is clear that the butler did it. For the maid was out on leave on
the day of the murder, the gardener is deaf and would not hear the
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doorbell. . . etc. etc.
What distinguishes this kind of usage from the standard one is that the in-
ference that leads to the conclusion can be arbitrarily complex. After making
the clarity assertion, the speaker immediately presents the inference.
Perhaps the simplicity of inference is just a pragmatic requirement in
the standard clarity assertion cases. When the inference is not presented
immediately by the speaker, the clarity assertion seems pointless as long as
the audience is not able to recover it: the assertion does not increase the
hearer’s confidence in the proposition stated.
6.7 Gradability
As emphasized by Barker (2009), clarity is gradable: we have expres-
sions like crystal clear, somewhat clearer etc. The theory presented here does
not allow us to capture this property of clarity assertions. I have to resort to
an informal description as to where the sources of gradability might be located.
There are several parameters by which inferences can be graded. Two
are the length of inference and the likelihood of discovering it. As Barker’s
example:
(150) It is reasonably clear that Mars is barren of life.
shows, clarity is gradable with respect to the level of confidence that the infer-
ence provides to its conclusion. Most inferences in everyday life employ some
amount of inductive and/or defeasible reasoning, so they don’t guarantee the
truth of their conclusion with absolute certainty. Moreover, people, with their
limited reasoning capabilities, sometimes doubt whether the derivation they
169
have just built qualifies as a valid (much less sound) inference. Conclusions of
inferences that are really bulletproof can be characterized as absolutely clear,
crystal clear, and inferences that employ a lot of heuristics, generic reasoning
and such can give rise to statements about propositions that are reasonably
clear or relatively clear. This analysis recovers much of the intuition behind
Barker’s theory. It also shows why mathematical inferences (even very long
and complicated ones) hardly ever give rise to gradable clarity:
(151) ??It is reasonably clear that Fermat’s Last theorem holds.
When sentences like (151) are used, this happens for the last of the reasons
mentioned: the speaker does not have complete confidence that the proof she
has in mind is correct.
The fact that clarity is gradable shows that we are unlikely to discover
one day exactly what pattern of inference can give rise to clarity assertions:
this is context dependent and vague. This vagueness can lead to side effects of
the sort described by Barker: a clarity assertion may serve to establish which
inferences count as easy. However, just like in cases with tall, such side effects
do not exhaust the meaning of the construction.
6.8 Formal presentation
Two features distinguish clarity assertions from the other constructions
studied in the thesis:
• There is a syntactic slot in the subcategorization frame of the construc-
tion for the premises of the inference:
It is clear to A from q that p
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• Inferences that give rise to clarity assertions are ‘heavier’ than those
leading to indirect speech, belief assertions or hearsay evidentials.
The first point gives rise only to a technical difficulty. If the from q part
is present, it needs to be reflected in the analysis of the construction. The one
I propose is
JIt is clear to A from q that pK =
Presupposition [LA](¬BAq → ¬〈ClearA〉BAp)
Assertion p ∧ 〈ClearA〉BAp
where Clear is the class of ‘easy’ inferences (to be discussed in a minute) and
L is a new elementary action — loss of a belief. The formula thus translates
as “If A loses the belief that q, he would not be able to easily deduce that p,
but as it stands, A can easily deduce that p.”
There is still a number of details to be ironed out. We need to specify
what happens when the non-obligatory syntactic arguments from q and to A
are omitted. When A is unspecified, it defaults to ‘every participant in the
current conversation’ — a composite agent whose beliefs are the intersection of
the participants’ individual beliefs. When there is no explicit q,4 it defaults to
the immediate public evidence (certainly not the vast body of common world
knowledge). This default works even if the A argument is present. Consider
(152) It is clear to me that Peter is lying.
4Syntactically, q cannot even be a finite sentence; it has to be nominalized. Thus we
have
(1) It is clear by the look on Peter’s face that he is lying.
or, at best, (proposition named, but not expressed)
(2) It is clear from the fact that Peter stutters that he lacks confidence.
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I might have a much closer acquaintance with Peter than my audience, which
allows me to recognize signs of dishonest behaviour, but the signs themselves
should be public and they have to play a crucial role in my inference for (152)
to be true.
Furthermore, the B operator in the formula above does not indicate
simple presence of a formula in an agent’s belief box, but ‘established’ presence
(compare Slobin and Aksu-Koc (1986)). In fact, a clarity assertion with an
explicitly specified agent A indicates that p is already present in A’s beliefs as
the result of an inference. The ‘belief loss’ operator L subtracts established
beliefs, and as a result the agent loses derived belief in p.
Another distinguishing feature of clarity assertions as compared with
the constructions we studied so far is that ‘easy’ inferences for the purposes
of this construction are much more complicated. In indirect speech and belief
ascriptions we searched for a decidable class of inferences; this decidability
allows the ascriber of an attitude to predict reliably that the ascribee would
make the inference in question as soon as need arises. In the typical use of a
clarity assertion — where A is unspecified and the default includes both the
speaker and the audience, the speaker does not believe that the audience has
already made the inference. The clarity assertion itself serves to stimulate the
audience to search for such an inference.
Inferences that serve in belief ascriptions and indirect speech — such
as conjunction simplification and scalar inferences, — are typically performed
without any conscious effort. They do not feel like inferences to a näıve
speaker. In the case of clarity assertions, such a speaker is typically very
much aware that a certain cognitive effort is required to reach the conclusion.
Moreover, our class of admissible inference should be bound not only from the
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above (where the inference becomes too hard), but also from below (where it
does not feel like inference anymore), as illustrated by examples like (136).
Unlike in belief reports or indirect speech, inferences employed in clarity
assertions are very often defeasible. It is the presence of such defeasible rules
that makes Barker and Taranto’s theory work in a lot of use cases.
All of that said, I will not attempt to specify with any precision, the
way I did in all the previous chapters, which class of inferences can justify
clarity assertions. This class seems to be very much dependent on the context
(something that is clear to a math professor may not be clear to a first grader).
Moreover, whether a given inference falls into the class seems to be vague,
leading to gradability of clarity assertions. A crude approximation could be
to assign a weight to each type of derivation rule and limit a weighted sum of
all rules used in a derivation.
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Conclusion
In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, a logical framework was introduced
and investigated. In the subsequent chapters, we saw this framework applied
to a number of natural language constructions. It makes sense to indicate how
various features of the logical framework turned out to be useful in describing
the linguistic data.
First of all, I have gained the greatest advantage from my decision
to choose rule schemas as the elementary actions in my dynamic logic. On
one hand, one needs to distinguish between applications of different rules;
otherwise there is no hope to characterize various inference classes supported
by constructions I consider. Thus, systems of Duc (2001) or Jago (2006)
would be insufficient. On the other hand, if a single instance of a rule is
treated as an elementary operation, in the style of Velázquez-Quesada (2011),
one would not be able to name any such operation in an analysis of linguistic
constructions. Quantification over elementary actions would be necessary and,
whenever iterated applications of the same rule are permitted, over finite chains
of elementary actions. In other words, rule schemas are the right level of
granularity of actions when describing linguistic constructions.
On the other hand, only part of operations mentioned in the linguis-
tic chapters of the dissertation can be specified using simple rule schemas of
Chapter 2. This formalism is sufficient for Natural Logic and substitution of
coreferential definite NPs. It is only partly sufficient for inference from igno-
rance (one has to supply a separate criterion that tells us where the rule is
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applicable). Similarly, defeasible inference steps, which can be used in clarity
assertions, require complicated rules of applicability. Translation between lan-
guages, allowed in indirect speech, cannot be represented as a set of inference
rules at all.
Iteration is required to express any class of inferences where a certain
rule can be used an unlimited number of times. This is needed for indirect
speech, belief ascriptions and the Bulgarian Renarrated. At the same time one
cannot restrict inference classes acceptable in natural language constructions
to those closed under iteration (that is, to classes where a set of rules used is
limited, but not the number of instances of each rule or their order). In Chap-
ter 4, I argued that existential generalization is not acceptable after “internal
perception” operations in belief reports. Such an analysis explains the puzzle
cases like the DENY problem, but as a result, belief inferences lack deduc-
tive closure in the sense of Konolige (1986). In the case of clarity assertions,
whatever analysis one chooses in order to formalize the “easy inference” class
employed in that construction, it should include a limitation on the number
of inference steps, and thus will also not be expressible as an iteration closure
over a set of rules.
It seems that the whole power of at least the language of Section 2.1 is
needed to adequately describe the linguistic data.
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